Still Innocents Abroad: The Relationship between Anti-Americanism and American Foreign Policy in the Middle East by Kennedy, Kelly
	  	  	  	  	  STILL	  INNOCENTS	  ABROAD:	  THE	  RELATIONSHIP	  BETWEEN	  ANTI-­‐AMERICANISM	  AND	  AMERICAN	  FOREIGN	  POLICY	  IN	  THE	  MIDDLE	  EAST	  	  	  by	  Kelly	  Kennedy	  	  	   A	  thesis	  presented	  in	  partial	  fulfillment	  of	  the	  requirements	  for	  completion	  Of	  the	  Bachelor	  of	  Arts	  degree	  in	  International	  Studies	  Croft	  Institute	  for	  International	  Studies	  Sally	  McDonnell	  Barksdale	  Honors	  College	  The	  University	  of	  Mississippi	  	   University,	  Mississippi	  	  May	  2015	  	   Approved	  By	   	   	   	  	  	  _________________________________________________	  Advisor:	  	  Professor	  Jeff	  Carter	  	  	  ________________________________________________	  Reader:	  	  Professor	  William	  Schenck	  	  	  ________________________________________________	  Reader:	  	  Professor	  Yael	  Zeira	  	  	  ________________________________________________	  Reader:	  	  Professor	  Melissa	  Graves	  
	   ii	  
	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
©	  2015	  Kelly	  Kennedy	  ALL	  RIGHTS	  RESERVED	  
	   iii	  
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	  	  	   The	  author	  would	  like	  to	  thank	  her	  advisor,	  Dr.	  Jeff	  Carter,	  for	  his	  guidance	  throughout	  the	  thesis	  writing	  process,	  and	  her	  three	  readers,	  Dr.	  Yael	  Zeira,	  Dr.	  William	  Schenck,	  and	  Melissa	  Graves,	  for	  their	  continued	  support	  and	  patience.	  	  	  The	  author	  would	  also	  like	  to	  thank	  Dr.	  Kees	  Gispen	  for	  his	  advice	  that	  greatly	  helped	  during	  the	  initial	  writing	  process	  and	  Wesley	  Yates	  who	  offered	  his	  take	  on	  any	  and	  all	  theoretical	  tangents.	  	   Finally,	  the	  author	  would	  like	  to	  especially	  thank	  her	  parents,	  Mike,	  Kathy,	  and	  Jim,	  for	  making	  it	  possible	  for	  her	  to	  travel	  and	  study	  abroad	  freely	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  	  Without	  those	  experiences,	  the	  inspiration	  for	  this	  thesis	  would	  never	  have	  been	  found.	  	  	  	   	  
	   iv	  
ABSTRACT	  KELLY	  KENNEDY:	  	  Still	  Innocents	  Abroad:	  The	  Relationship	  Between	  Anti-­‐Americanism	  and	  American	  Foreign	  Policy	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  	  	   In	  this	  thesis,	  the	  author	  examined	  the	  relationship	  between	  anti-­‐American	  sentiment	  and	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  	  The	  author	  first	  constructed	  a	  literature	  review	  on	  anti-­‐Americanism,	  including	  sections	  discussing	  its	  definition,	  conceptualization,	  measurement	  techniques,	  and	  known	  sources.	  	  From	  this	  literature	  review,	  the	  author	  created	  her	  own	  definition	  of	  anti-­‐Americanism	  and	  a	  hypothesis	  that	  anti-­‐Americanism	  is	  endogenous	  to	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy—anti-­‐Americanism	  may	  increase	  or	  decrease	  depending	  on	  changes	  to	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  	  The	  author	  then	  used	  a	  quantitative	  comparison	  of	  survey	  data	  and	  two	  qualitative	  case	  studies	  to	  test	  her	  hypothesis.	  	  The	  comparison	  of	  survey	  data	  concluded	  there	  is	  a	  correlation	  between	  anti-­‐Americanism	  and	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy.	  	  Data	  measuring	  anti-­‐American	  sentiment	  and	  positive	  views	  of	  American	  policies	  had	  a	  negative	  relationship,	  indicating	  high	  anti-­‐American	  sentiment	  correlated	  to	  disapproval	  of	  policies.	  	  However,	  the	  methods	  used	  to	  show	  this	  correlation	  were	  not	  capable	  of	  indicating	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  relationship.	  	  In	  the	  case	  studies,	  the	  author	  showed	  that	  spikes	  in	  anti-­‐Americanism	  over	  time	  correlated	  to	  shifts	  in	  American	  policies	  that	  had	  a	  real	  or	  perceived	  adverse	  effect	  on	  the	  populations	  within	  the	  Middle	  East.	  	  The	  results	  from	  the	  case	  studies	  was	  much	  more	  clear,	  and	  they	  indicated	  both	  a	  correlation	  between	  the	  two	  factors	  and	  the	  endogeneity	  of	  anti-­‐Americanism.	  	  The	  author	  concluded	  with	  the	  results	  of	  her	  research,	  as	  well	  as	  recommendations	  for	  how	  future	  research	  might	  benefit	  from	  her	  difficulties.	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Introduction	  	   While	  on	  my	  study	  abroad	  in	  Jordan,	  I	  was	  confronted	  by	  the	  reality	  of	  America’s	  political	  image	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  	  Jordanians	  are	  amazingly	  hospitable,	  and	  most	  people	  I	  met	  were	  encouraging	  of	  foreigners	  studying	  Arabic.	  	  However,	  in	  discussions	  of	  politics	  and	  internal	  affairs,	  people’s	  opinions	  of	  specific	  nations,	  America	  in	  particular,	  were	  much	  more	  negative.	  	  I	  often	  heard	  one	  phrase	  repeated	  throughout	  most	  political	  conversations:	  	  “[We/Jordanians/Palestinians]	  understand	  that	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  American	  government	  do	  not	  always	  reflect	  the	  [thoughts/wishes/wants/feelings]	  of	  the	  American	  people.”	  	  	  For	  the	  most	  part,	  the	  phrase	  was	  followed	  by	  another	  statement	  explaining	  how	  much	  the	  speaker	  liked	  the	  Americans	  he/she	  had	  met	  or	  how	  they	  loved	  American	  movies	  and	  products.	  	  I	  initially	  questioned	  why	  the	  people	  I	  met	  seemed	  so	  eager	  to	  think	  the	  U.S.	  government	  was	  oppressing	  Americans,	  but	  I	  eventually	  realized	  the	  statement	  was	  meant	  to	  be	  more	  respectful	  than	  deprecating.	  	  Many	  who	  made	  the	  statement	  thought	  well	  of	  Americans,	  but	  disagreed	  with	  our	  government	  and	  its	  actions.	  	  What	  I	  interpreted	  as	  a	  misunderstanding	  of	  the	  American	  political	  system	  is	  really	  an	  explanation	  of	  the	  complex	  feeling	  many	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  have	  towards	  the	  United	  States.	  	  While	  many	  of	  my	  friends	  from	  Jordan	  enjoyed	  American	  culture	  and	  wanted	  to	  visit,	  they	  found	  it	  difficult	  to	  justify	  why	  they	  liked	  a	  country	  that	  they	  also	  disagreed	  with.	  	   When	  I	  was	  in	  Jordan,	  I	  often	  felt	  uncomfortable	  with	  my	  identity	  as	  an	  American.	  	  There	  is	  a	  tangible	  level	  of	  anti-­‐Americanism	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  currently,	  and	  Americans	  who	  live	  there	  frequently	  hide	  their	  support	  of	  the	  U.S.	  to	  better	  fit	  in.	  	  Collecting	  data	  from	  those	  who	  feel	  negatively	  toward	  the	  United	  States	  has	  helped	  researchers	  achieve	  insight	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into	  the	  reasons	  for	  anti-­‐Americanism.	  	  However,	  there	  are	  many	  causes	  of	  anti-­‐Americanism,	  and	  it	  is	  unlikely	  one	  cause	  has	  a	  large	  enough	  effect	  on	  public	  sentiment	  to	  account	  for	  all	  of	  anti-­‐Americanism.	  	  I	  personally	  have	  a	  number	  of	  questions	  on	  how	  anti-­‐Americanism	  began	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  why	  it	  is	  so	  important.	  	  My	  experiences	  with	  anti-­‐Americanism	  varied	  among	  the	  communities	  I	  visited.	  	  While	  I	  anticipated	  anti-­‐American	  sentiment	  in	  more	  conservative	  communities,	  I	  often	  felt	  more	  initially	  unwelcome	  among	  peers,	  who	  more	  often	  expected	  specific	  stereotypes.	  	  	  In	  this	  thesis,	  I	  focus	  on	  American	  foreign	  policy	  choices	  as	  a	  possible	  cause.	  	  My	  thought	  is	  that	  unpopular	  American	  policies	  could	  influence	  people’s	  individual	  opinions	  toward	  the	  U.S.,	  which	  results	  in	  negative	  public	  opinion	  and	  anti-­‐Americanism	  overall.	  	  I	  begin	  with	  a	  discussion	  of	  anti-­‐Americanism	  itself	  and	  explain	  how	  it	  acts	  as	  an	  attitude	  of	  public	  opinion.	  	  Then	  I	  analyze	  survey	  results	  and	  qualitative	  sources	  to	  answer	  a	  central	  research	  question:	  is	  there	  an	  endogenous	  relationship	  between	  anti-­‐Americanism	  and	  American	  foreign	  policy?	  	  I	  end	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  intelligence	  analysis	  and	  how	  the	  U.S.	  government	  is	  looking	  into	  social	  media	  as	  a	  possible	  source	  for	  quick	  snapshot	  estimates	  of	  public	  sentiment	  on	  popular	  topics.	  	   Ultimately,	  I	  hope	  the	  argument	  presented	  in	  this	  thesis	  will	  expand	  upon	  current	  research	  and	  encourage	  others	  to	  look	  for	  relationships	  hidden	  just	  beneath	  the	  surface.	  	  This	  thesis	  is	  a	  combination	  of	  my	  favorite	  subjects—Middle	  Eastern	  studies,	  public	  opinion,	  and	  security	  studies—and	  is	  the	  culmination	  of	  my	  studies	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Mississippi.	  	  I	  want	  my	  research	  to	  inspire	  further	  questioning	  of	  anti-­‐Americanism	  and	  how	  the	  United	  States	  as	  a	  country	  addresses	  it.	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Chapter	  1:	  Anti-­‐Americanism	  	   Anti-­‐Americanism	  is	  a	  broad	  concept,	  and	  discussing	  it	  requires	  some	  unpacking	  of	  the	  term.	  	  In	  the	  media,	  anti-­‐Americanism	  is	  often	  tied	  to	  public	  opinion.	  	  When	  referred	  to	  in	  general	  terms,	  this	  can	  make	  anti-­‐Americanism	  seem	  like	  a	  simple	  construct,	  whose	  influences	  and	  components	  rarely	  change.	  	  In	  truth,	  anti-­‐Americanism	  is	  nuanced,	  and	  the	  study	  of	  it	  requires	  a	  hodge-­‐podge	  of	  various	  observations	  and	  calculations,	  all	  focusing	  on	  one	  theme:	  distaste	  for	  America.	  	  	  In	  the	  next	  section,	  I	  will	  discuss	  the	  literature	  available	  on	  anti-­‐Americanism	  as	  well	  as	  how	  to	  define	  it	  in	  a	  global	  context.	  	  It	  is	  sometimes	  difficult	  to	  logically	  connect	  sources	  discussing	  anti-­‐Americanism,	  as	  authors	  choose	  to	  discuss	  the	  concept	  using	  different	  methods.	  	  However,	  I	  have	  organized	  my	  literature	  review	  into	  three	  distinct	  parts,	  which	  I	  hope	  will	  illuminate	  the	  common	  themes	  in	  the	  literature.	  	  In	  this	  review,	  I	  first	  discuss	  the	  challenge	  of	  conceptualizing	  “anti-­‐Americanism”.	  	  I	  include	  discussions	  of	  both	  past	  criticisms	  of	  the	  term	  and	  modern	  attempts	  to	  establish	  its	  context.	  	  I	  then	  describe	  the	  process	  political	  scientists	  and	  other	  researchers	  use	  to	  measure	  anti-­‐Americanism	  throughout	  the	  world,	  as	  well	  as	  methods	  that	  allow	  for	  bias	  and	  how	  current	  researchers	  have	  attempted	  to	  correct	  for	  past	  mistakes.	  	  In	  the	  final	  section,	  I	  shed	  light	  on	  the	  current	  debate	  within	  the	  literature	  on	  the	  reasons	  for	  anti-­‐Americanism	  and	  the	  role	  America	  plays	  in	  perpetuating	  the	  discrimination	  against	  it.	  	  Defining	  “Anti-­‐Americanism”	  	   “Anti-­‐Americanism”	  must	  first	  be	  defined	  as	  a	  concept	  before	  it	  can	  be	  understood	  and	  evaluated	  scientifically.	  	  Unfortunately,	  there	  is	  somewhat	  of	  a	  disagreement	  within	  the	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literature	  on	  the	  exact	  language	  to	  use.	  	  Scholars	  who	  study	  anti-­‐American	  sentiment	  agree	  that	  “anti-­‐Americanism”	  refers	  to	  systematic	  and	  comprehensive	  hatred	  of	  America	  and	  its	  identity	  (Friedman	  2012).	  	  But	  people	  who	  declare	  their	  disapproval	  of	  the	  U.S.	  may	  in	  the	  same	  breath	  discuss	  their	  love	  of	  American	  food,	  culture,	  and	  TV	  shows	  (Chiozza	  2009).	  	  As	  journalists	  and	  political	  pundits	  use	  “anti-­‐Americanism”	  to	  describe	  the	  roots	  of	  terrorism,	  the	  term	  has	  experienced	  resurgence	  in	  popularity.	  	  Use	  of	  the	  word	  has	  trickled	  down	  from	  academia	  to	  common	  political	  discourse.	  	  It	  has	  taken	  on	  a	  meaning	  that	  refers	  to	  any	  and	  all	  negative	  statements	  against	  America,	  and	  the	  misuse	  of	  “anti-­‐Americanism”	  has	  consequences	  on	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  term	  while	  minimizing	  the	  reality	  that	  America	  could	  deserve	  well-­‐founded	  critique.	  Oddly	  enough,	  issues	  with	  usage	  of	  “anti-­‐Americanism”	  likely	  appeared	  in	  tandem	  with	  the	  term.	  	  Though	  the	  first	  known	  use	  of	  the	  word	  dates	  back	  to	  1765,	  “Anti-­‐American”	  initally	  appeared	  in	  Webster’s	  American	  English	  dictionary	  in	  1828	  (“Anti-­‐American”,	  Merriam-­‐Webster	  Dictionary).	  	  At	  the	  time,	  American	  authors	  used	  “anti-­‐American”	  to	  describe	  foreign	  writers’	  tendency	  to	  depict	  American	  manners	  and	  culture	  as	  rude	  or	  stupid	  (Katzenstein	  &	  Keohane	  2007).	  	  However,	  the	  term	  quickly	  took	  on	  other	  interpretations.	  	  Alexis	  de	  Tocqueville	  was	  the	  first	  to	  discuss	  Americans’	  liberal	  use	  of	  “anti-­‐American”	  to	  explain	  any	  criticism	  at	  all	  (Katzenstein	  &	  Keohane	  2007).	  	  De	  Tocqueville	  ascribed	  the	  liberal	  use	  of	  the	  term	  to	  Americans’	  “inability	  to	  take	  censure”	  that	  competed	  with	  their	  “desire	  for	  praise”	  (Katzenstein	  &	  Keohane	  2007).	  	  	  As	  the	  United	  States’	  prominence	  in	  world	  affairs	  grew,	  the	  use	  of	  “anti-­‐Americanism”	  shifted	  from	  a	  response	  to	  cultural	  commentary	  to	  something	  more	  serious	  and	  security	  related.	  	  Military	  conflicts,	  like	  the	  Cold	  War	  and	  Vietnam,	  and	  a	  fear	  of	  the	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ideological	  movements	  behind	  them	  increased	  the	  discussion	  of	  “anti-­‐Americanism”	  in	  regard	  to	  national	  security	  concerns	  (Friedman	  2012	  &	  Rubin	  2002).	  	  McCarthy	  and	  his	  oppression	  of	  “un-­‐American”	  activities	  exemplify	  the	  height	  of	  this	  fear	  mongering	  (Friedman	  2012).	  	  After	  the	  September	  11,	  2001	  attacks	  on	  the	  World	  Trade	  center,	  use	  of	  	  “anti-­‐Americanism”	  as	  a	  buzzword	  continued	  to	  increase	  in	  American	  politics	  (Friedman	  2012).	  	  Many	  pundits	  and	  politicians	  used	  “anti-­‐Americanism”	  with	  such	  fervor	  that	  any	  questions	  about	  the	  oversimplification	  of	  the	  concept	  were	  likely	  drowned	  out	  (Friedman	  2012).	  	  In	  its	  first	  chapter,	  the	  9/11	  Commission	  Report	  declared	  “anti-­‐Americanism”	  as	  a	  primary	  reason	  for	  the	  September	  11	  attacks	  and	  reaffirmed	  the	  need	  to	  defend	  all	  that	  was	  “American”	  and	  defeat	  anyone	  who	  was	  “against”	  it	  (The	  9/11	  Commission	  Report,	  2004).	  	  America	  saw	  the	  reemergence	  of	  an	  “us	  v.	  them”	  ideology,	  this	  time	  in	  reference	  to	  “terrorism”	  and	  our	  ideological	  war	  to	  end	  it.	  Currently,	  “anti-­‐Americanism”	  is	  defined	  very	  broadly	  and	  often	  includes	  any	  type	  of	  action,	  speech,	  or	  opinion	  that	  is	  negative	  or	  hostile	  toward	  the	  United	  States.	  	  This	  could	  be	  detrimental	  to	  the	  public’s	  understanding	  of	  anti-­‐Americanism	  if	  most	  available	  sources	  rely	  on	  this	  definition.	  	  Wikipedia,	  the	  free	  encyclopedic	  source	  available	  on	  the	  Internet,	  uses	  the	  broadest	  definition	  of	  anti-­‐Americanism	  possible,	  with	  no	  references	  to	  the	  very	  comprehensive	  nature	  of	  research	  (“Anti-­‐Americanism”,	  2014).	  	  News	  sources,	  which	  many	  Americans	  rely	  on	  for	  factual	  political	  information	  (Zaller	  1992),	  also	  tend	  to	  use	  the	  broad	  definition.	  	  Some	  political	  scientists	  have	  highlighted	  the	  problems	  resulting	  from	  the	  sensationalization	  of	  anti-­‐Americanism	  in	  the	  media,	  and	  they	  believe	  this	  may	  be	  a	  reason	  for	  the	  rise	  in	  fear	  and	  isolationism	  within	  the	  U.S.	  population	  (Friedman	  2012	  &	  Rugh	  2006).	  	  Research,	  however,	  has	  benefitted	  from	  the	  fear	  associated	  with	  anti-­‐American	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sentiment,	  as	  policymakers	  place	  a	  greater	  importance	  on	  determining	  its	  root	  causes.	  	  After	  the	  terrorist	  attacks	  of	  September	  11,	  2001,	  lawmakers	  and	  academics	  searched	  for	  reasons	  why	  extremists	  specifically	  targeted	  the	  United	  States	  in	  such	  a	  violent	  attack.	  	  Many	  of	  the	  resulting	  studies	  pointed	  to	  an	  increase	  in	  anti-­‐American	  sentiment	  as	  the	  reason	  (Rubin	  2002).	  As	  I	  have	  come	  to	  understand	  it,	  a	  statement	  being	  anti-­‐American	  depends	  largely	  on	  the	  topic	  of	  conversation.	  	  Individuals	  can	  be	  anti-­‐American	  when	  discussing	  politics	  but	  pro-­‐American	  when	  discussing	  TV	  shows	  (Chiozza	  2009).	  	  This	  distinction	  is	  particularly	  apparent	  for	  salient	  political	  or	  social	  issues	  and	  when	  an	  individual	  has	  less	  connection	  to	  the	  topic	  (Rugh	  2006	  &	  Blaydes	  &	  Linzer	  2012).	  	  For	  these	  reason,	  I	  assess	  that	  anti-­‐American	  sentiment	  has	  more	  to	  do	  with	  an	  individual’s	  pre-­‐formulated	  feelings	  on	  a	  topic	  and	  the	  U.S.	  than	  America	  itself.	  	  Anti-­‐Americanism	  is	  an	  overall	  tendency	  to	  have	  negative	  views	  of	  the	  United	  States	  in	  most	  things,	  regardless	  of	  the	  issues’	  correlation	  to	  the	  U.S.	  (Friedman	  2012).	  	  However,	  my	  own	  experiences	  suggest	  that	  anti-­‐Americanism	  manifests	  more	  often	  in	  political	  sentiments	  more	  than	  cultural	  ones.	  	  If	  individuals	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  anti-­‐American	  about	  political	  issues	  than	  cultural	  issues,	  how	  does	  anyone	  distinguish	  “anti-­‐Americanism”	  from	  political	  critique?	  	  It	  is	  intriguing	  to	  think	  that	  what	  Americans	  may	  be	  again	  falling	  into	  the	  same	  trap	  as	  their	  predecessors,	  by	  labeling	  anything	  negative	  towards	  the	  U.S.	  as	  “anti-­‐American”.	  	  What	  if	  anti-­‐Americanism	  is	  in	  some	  way	  legitimized	  by	  the	  U.S.’s	  actions?	  	  I	  hope	  that	  in-­‐depth	  research	  into	  what	  is	  known	  about	  anti-­‐Americanism	  and	  my	  own	  examination	  of	  trends	  in	  anti-­‐Americanism	  over	  the	  last	  decade	  can	  shed	  some	  light.	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Conceptualizing	  Anti-­‐American	  Sentiment:	  “Us”	  v.	  “Them”	  Popular	  theories	  on	  the	  causes	  of	  anti-­‐Americanism	  are	  attributed	  to	  one	  of	  two	  sources:	  “them”	  or	  “us”.	  	  “Them”	  theorists	  describe	  the	  origins	  of	  anti-­‐Americanism	  as	  opposition	  or	  hostility	  to	  the	  America	  due	  to	  the	  U.S.’s	  position	  in	  the	  international	  community;	  America	  is	  not	  an	  active	  player	  in	  anti-­‐Americanism	  (Chiozza	  2009,	  Jamal	  2014	  &	  Friedman	  2012).	  	  Those	  who	  attribute	  the	  same	  problems	  to	  “us”	  see	  the	  origins	  of	  anti-­‐Americanism	  as	  opposition	  or	  hostility	  to	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  U.S.	  (Friedman	  2012).	  	  In	  the	  “us”	  theories,	  America	  takes	  an	  active	  role	  in	  generating	  anti-­‐American	  sentiment	  through	  its	  actions	  and	  policies	  (Friedman	  2012	  &	  Jamal	  2014).	  	  Realistically,	  both	  views	  are	  simplifications	  of	  a	  much	  more	  complex	  situation.	  	  There	  are	  many	  examples	  to	  suggest	  that	  both	  theories	  could	  be	  right,	  and	  so	  studies	  tend	  to	  shy	  away	  from	  declaring	  one	  superior	  to	  the	  other	  (Katzenstein	  &	  Keohane	  2007	  &	  Friedman	  2012).	  	  Research	  is	  not	  blind	  to	  common	  sentiments	  on	  anti-­‐Americanism,	  though,	  and	  many	  researchers	  test	  these	  popular	  concepts	  against	  accepted	  understandings	  of	  public	  opinion	  to	  gain	  a	  better	  appreciation	  of	  anti-­‐Americanism.	  	  In	  my	  review	  of	  the	  literature,	  I	  studied	  a	  number	  of	  sources	  that	  each	  approached	  the	  question	  of	  anti-­‐Americanism’s	  sources	  in	  a	  slightly	  different	  way.	  	  A	  few	  of	  the	  sources	  stood	  out	  as	  together	  they	  present	  a	  multi-­‐faceted	  view	  of	  anti-­‐Americanism	  that	  allowed	  me	  to	  better	  define	  the	  concept.	  One	  of	  the	  authors	  who	  address	  these	  popular	  theories	  is	  Giacomo	  Chiozza.	  	  Chiozza	  tackles	  oversimplification	  of	  anti-­‐Americanism	  by	  breaking	  down	  feelings	  about	  the	  U.S.	  in	  a	  multi-­‐faceted	  approach.	  	  Chiozza	  collected	  data	  from	  multiple	  databases	  of	  worldwide	  public	  opinion	  surveys	  (such	  as	  Pew	  Global	  Attitudes	  Project	  and	  Zogby	  International)	  and	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separated	  the	  responses	  on	  the	  U.S.	  into	  topical	  categories	  (2009).	  	  These	  categories	  were	  based	  on	  the	  question	  asked	  but	  all	  focused	  on	  aspects	  of	  American	  society	  (Chiozza	  2009).	  	  	  In	  his	  analysis	  of	  the	  responses,	  Chiozza	  found	  that	  “anti-­‐Americanism”	  is	  not	  a	  singular	  concept	  but	  rather	  one	  with	  multiple	  perspectives	  (2009).	  	  He	  explained	  that	  respondents	  who	  initially	  voiced	  negative	  opinions	  on	  the	  U.S.	  overall	  frequently	  responded	  favorably	  when	  asked	  about	  aspects	  of	  American	  society	  and	  culture	  (2009).	  	  This	  shows	  that	  negative	  opinion	  of	  the	  U.S.	  on	  the	  whole,	  or	  anti-­‐Americanism,	  does	  not	  translate	  to	  similar	  opinions	  on	  a	  personal	  preferences	  level.	  	  Chiozza’s	  analysis	  suggests	  that	  anti-­‐Americanism	  cannot	  be	  an	  unjustifiable,	  singular	  prejudice	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  as	  many	  choose	  to	  see	  it.	  	  Anti-­‐Americanism	  more	  likely	  arises	  because	  of	  environmental	  stimuli	  that	  put	  pressure	  on	  groups	  to	  find	  a	  scapegoat	  for	  problems;	  by	  blaming	  the	  U.S.,	  governments	  can	  benefit	  by	  diverting	  the	  public’s	  gaze	  from	  the	  real	  problems	  in	  a	  country,	  at	  least	  for	  a	  little	  while	  (Chiozza	  2009).	  	  The	  same	  stimuli	  could	  also	  encourage	  the	  same	  groups	  to	  distance	  themselves	  from	  the	  U.S.	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  benefits,	  perhaps	  in	  the	  form	  of	  popular	  support	  or	  alliances	  with	  states	  in	  opposition	  to	  the	  U.S.	  (Chiozza	  2009).	  Giacomo	  Chiozza’s	  analysis	  supports	  the	  claim	  that	  anti-­‐Americanism	  arises	  due	  more	  to	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  U.S.	  than	  due	  to	  mere	  prejudice,	  and	  other	  authors	  support	  this	  conclusion.	  	  Peter	  Katzenstein	  and	  Robert	  Keohane	  published	  a	  book	  in	  2007	  redefining	  anti-­‐Americanism	  as	  an	  umbrella	  definition	  with	  different	  manifestations	  based	  on	  the	  situation	  in	  which	  they	  arise.	  	  The	  authors	  recognize	  a	  total	  of	  four	  “typologies”	  of	  anti-­‐Americanism	  in	  their	  analysis—	  liberal,	  social,	  sovereign-­‐nationalist,	  and	  radical.	  	  The	  name	  of	  each	  typology	  refers	  to	  the	  reason	  a	  group	  takes	  issue	  with	  the	  U.S.	  (Katzenstein	  &	  Keohane	  2007).	  	  Katzenstein	  and	  Keohane’s	  four	  typologies	  describe	  the	  actions	  of	  states	  as	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opposed	  to	  individuals	  (2007).	  	  The	  authors	  assume	  states	  function	  as	  a	  collective	  and	  that	  their	  actions	  reflect	  the	  attitudes	  of	  the	  public	  and	  not	  the	  attitudes	  of	  specific	  individuals.	  	  However,	  Katzenstein	  and	  Keohane	  do	  leave	  room	  for	  a	  constructive	  argument	  for	  their	  anti-­‐Americanism	  typologies.	  	  The	  anti-­‐American	  sentiment	  within	  a	  state	  can	  be	  defined	  using	  multiple	  typologies	  at	  once	  (Katzenstein	  &	  Keohane	  2007).	  	  This	  indicates	  that	  groups	  with	  varied	  opinions	  and	  political	  sentiments	  could	  live	  within	  the	  same	  state	  and	  give	  the	  state	  multiple	  layers	  of	  anti-­‐American	  sentiment,	  which	  is	  exhibited	  in	  different	  ways.	   Liberal	  anti-­‐Americanism	  sits	  at	  the	  lowest	  end	  of	  the	  spectrum.	  	  In	  this	  case,	  states	  similar	  to	  America	  dislike	  the	  U.S.	  for	  not	  “living	  up	  to	  its	  own	  ideals”	  (Katzenstein	  &	  Keohane	  2007).	  	  Social	  anti-­‐American	  states	  dislike	  the	  U.S.’s	  lack	  of	  social	  welfare;	  Keohane	  recognizes	  that	  many	  states	  in	  this	  group	  are	  European	  Christian	  democracies,	  like	  Germany	  (Katzenstein	  &	  Keohane	  2007).	  	  Sovereign-­‐nationalists	  may	  not	  be	  concerned	  with	  the	  U.S.’s	  ideology,	  but	  they	  feel	  America	  is	  disrupting	  their	  own	  national	  goals	  and	  ambitions	  (Katzenstein	  &	  Keohane	  2007).	  	  An	  example	  of	  a	  sovereign-­‐nationalist	  anti-­‐American	  state	  is	  Iran.	  	  On	  the	  other	  end	  is	  Radical	  anti-­‐Americanism,	  where	  groups	  with	  very	  different	  ideologies	  from	  that	  of	  America	  take	  issue	  with	  the	  U.S.	  as	  a	  perceived	  threat	  to	  their	  ideological	  cause	  (Katzenstein	  &	  Keohane	  2007).	  Keohane’s	  conceptualization	  of	  anti-­‐Americanism	  is	  particularly	  good	  at	  distinguishing	  between	  different	  causes	  of	  anti-­‐American	  sentiment.	  	  While	  Chiozza	  shows	  how	  it	  can	  be	  hard	  to	  connect	  anti-­‐American	  sentiment	  with	  specific	  reasons	  for	  the	  disdain,	  Keohane	  explains	  that	  differences	  in	  ideology	  could	  actually	  make	  a	  base	  for	  anti-­‐Americanism.	  	  Ideological	  differences	  may	  not	  be	  the	  origins	  of	  anti-­‐American	  sentiment	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within	  a	  state	  or	  group,	  but	  they	  can	  be	  the	  reason	  why	  certain	  groups	  are	  upset	  by	  America’s	  actions	  and	  others	  are	  not.	  The	  last	  author	  in	  my	  review	  of	  anti-­‐Americanism’s	  conceptualization	  is	  Max	  Paul	  Friedman.	  	  Friedman	  writes	  on	  the	  sociological	  toll	  anti-­‐American	  sentiment	  takes	  on	  Americans	  and	  America’s	  allies.	  	  Though	  Friedman’s	  approach	  to	  anti-­‐Americanism	  is	  less	  quantitative	  than	  that	  of	  Chiozza	  or	  Katzenstein	  and	  Keohane,	  he	  attacks	  the	  tendency	  to	  generalize	  anti-­‐American	  sentiment	  as	  one	  principle	  in	  much	  the	  same	  way.	  	  Friedman	  cites	  a	  disconnect	  between	  the	  definition	  of	  anti-­‐Americanism	  used	  in	  academic	  circles	  and	  that	  which	  is	  used	  in	  public	  discourse,	  either	  on	  the	  news	  or	  in	  political	  forums	  (2012).	  	  The	  author	  explains	  this	  is	  likely	  due	  to	  ignorance	  of	  anti-­‐Americanism’s	  complexity,	  or	  a	  decided	  tendency	  to	  view	  anti-­‐American	  rhetoric	  as	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  “clash	  of	  civilizations”	  between	  the	  “one	  true	  superpower”	  and	  its	  “haters”	  (2012).	  	  Friedman	  writes	  that	  most	  modern	  historians	  and	  political	  scientists	  prefer	  a	  much	  more	  comprehensive	  and	  nuanced	  version	  of	  anti-­‐Americanism	  than	  “haters	  gonna	  hate”1	  (Friedman	  2012).	  	  Instead,	  he	  characterizes	  anti-­‐Americanism	  as	  a	  complicated	  prejudice	  of	  “American”	  things	  (Friedman	  2012).	  	  In	  order	  for	  an	  action	  or	  opinion	  to	  be	  anti-­‐American,	  it	  must	  be	  both	  “particularized”,	  or	  toward	  the	  U.S.	  in	  particular	  and	  not	  similar	  nations,	  and	  “generalized”,	  or	  toward	  multiple	  facets	  of	  American	  identity	  and	  not	  a	  focused	  critique	  on	  one	  element	  (2012).	  	  	  Friedman	  makes	  a	  careful	  distinction	  between	  an	  outright	  prejudice	  against	  the	  U.S.	  and	  a	  well-­‐founded	  critique	  of	  its	  policies	  or	  culture,	  but	  he	  would	  ultimately	  likely	  agree	  with	  Chiozza	  and	  Katzenstein	  and	  Keohane.	  	  Friedman	  suggests	  that	  a	  critique	  may	  be	  well	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Quote	  from	  Lynch	  2013	  in	  bibliography	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founded,	  but	  it	  does	  not	  have	  bearing	  on	  an	  individual’s	  opinion	  of	  “America”.	  	  Anti-­‐Americanism	  involves	  an	  emotional	  response	  to	  stimuli	  and	  is	  unrelated	  to	  critique,	  though	  they	  may	  support	  one	  another.	  	  The	  best	  conceptualization	  of	  anti-­‐Americanism	  is	  likely	  a	  combination	  of	  many	  findings	  all	  at	  once.	  	  It	  is	  nuanced,	  as	  Chiozza	  insists,	  variegated,	  as	  Katzenstein	  and	  Keohane	  show,	  and	  refers	  only	  to	  a	  respondent’s	  opinion	  of	  general	  “America”,	  as	  Friedman	  demands.	  	  Multiple	  groups	  across	  the	  globe	  may	  illustrate	  “anti-­‐Americanism”,	  but	  the	  vehemence	  or	  relation	  to	  critiques	  of	  the	  U.S.	  is	  unclear	  until	  further	  contextualized.	  	  While	  this	  conceptualization	  might	  support	  my	  original	  understanding	  of	  anti-­‐Americanism,	  it	  brings	  up	  the	  question	  of	  how	  good	  current	  measurements	  of	  “anti-­‐American	  sentiment”	  really	  are.	  	  	  	  	  	  Anti-­‐Americanism	  as	  a	  Public	  Opinion	  The	  methods	  of	  analysis	  used	  for	  anti-­‐Americanism	  can	  be	  divided	  into	  two	  categories:	  qualitative	  and	  quantitative.	  	  Qualitative	  methods	  resemble	  those	  used	  by	  Max	  Paul	  Friedman,	  and	  involve	  analysis	  of	  historical	  documents	  and	  news	  articles	  or	  personal	  accounts	  from	  officials	  who	  worked	  in	  the	  country	  at	  the	  time.	  	  Quantitative	  methods	  of	  analysis	  for	  anti-­‐Americanism	  most	  resemble	  those	  used	  by	  Giacomo	  Chiozza.	  	  The	  most	  popular	  quantitative	  method	  for	  gathering	  data	  on	  anti-­‐American	  sentiment	  is	  surveying,	  but	  other	  types	  could	  include	  coding	  the	  sources	  used	  in	  qualitative	  analysis	  and	  conducting	  further	  analysis	  quantitatively.	  	  A	  mixed	  methods	  approach	  is	  a	  combination	  of	  both	  quantitative	  and	  qualitative	  methods,	  and	  often	  offers	  the	  clearest	  results.	  Authors	  writing	  on	  anti-­‐Americanism	  in	  today’s	  context	  frequently	  take	  advantage	  of	  respected,	  easily	  accessible	  data	  sets	  from	  large	  global	  opinion	  surveys.	  	  These	  surveys,	  like	  the	  Pew	  Global	  Attitudes	  Project,	  are	  funded	  and	  carried	  out	  by	  think	  tanks,	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universities,	  or	  private	  companies	  with	  the	  goal	  of	  gaining	  insight	  into	  global	  trends	  for	  research	  or	  business	  purposes	  (Tessler	  2011).	  	  Upon	  completion	  of	  their	  own	  research,	  the	  institutes	  usually	  publish	  the	  original	  data	  sets	  for	  public	  use.	  	  Researchers	  analyze	  the	  surveys	  and	  determine	  which	  questions	  within	  them	  could	  function	  as	  indicators	  for	  their	  research.	  	  These	  indicator	  questions	  are	  then	  combined	  in	  multiple	  ways	  to	  provide	  insight	  on	  research	  questions	  that	  may	  not	  be	  directly	  asked	  about	  in	  the	  surveys	  (Tessler	  2011).	  	  Using	  the	  data	  provided	  for	  the	  indicator	  questions,	  researchers	  can	  analyze	  it	  and	  extrapolate	  an	  answer	  to	  their	  research	  question.	  Researchers	  use	  public	  opinion	  surveys	  because	  anti-­‐Americanism	  functions	  and	  fluctuates	  as	  an	  attitude	  within	  public	  opinion.	  	  The	  Nature	  and	  Origins	  of	  Mass	  Opinion,	  written	  by	  John	  Zaller	  in	  1992,	  explains	  how	  public	  opinion	  is	  formed	  and	  that	  it	  can	  be	  changed	  quickly	  or	  over	  long	  periods	  of	  time.	  	  Zaller	  argues	  that	  all	  people	  have	  internal	  belief	  systems,	  which	  allow	  them	  to	  formulate	  opinions	  on	  certain	  topics	  (1992).	  	  Changing	  these	  opinions	  can	  take	  a	  very	  long	  or	  very	  short	  period	  of	  time,	  depending	  on	  how	  tied	  the	  formulation	  of	  the	  opinion	  is	  to	  an	  individual’s	  belief	  system	  (Zaller	  1992).	  	  	  Due	  to	  lack	  of	  personal	  knowledge	  or	  interest,	  there	  are	  always	  a	  few	  topics	  people	  are	  unable	  to	  formulate	  an	  opinion	  on	  (Zaller	  1992).	  	  For	  these	  topics,	  people	  will	  defer	  to	  “elites”—	  the	  media	  or	  public	  figures	  that	  drive	  changes	  in	  opinion—	  for	  more	  information	  or	  an	  agreeable	  substitute	  opinion	  (Zaller	  1992).	  	  If	  an	  elite’s	  message	  deals	  with	  a	  particularly	  salient	  issue,	  then	  the	  public	  will	  respond	  to	  it	  more	  (Zaller	  1992).	  	  The	  United	  States	  has	  a	  heavy	  presence	  in	  the	  world,	  both	  politically	  and	  culturally	  (Rugh	  2006	  &	  Chiozza	  2009).	  	  But	  for	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  world,	  too	  few	  people	  have	  prolonged	  enough	  contact	  with	  Americans	  or	  America	  to	  develop	  a	  strong	  opinion	  about	  them	  (Rugh	  2006	  &	  Chiozza	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2009).	  	  Therefore,	  as	  the	  U.S.	  grows	  in	  importance,	  elites’	  opinions	  on	  America	  become	  more	  important	  to	  the	  public.	  	  Views	  on	  the	  United	  States	  are	  more	  susceptible	  to	  changes	  in	  the	  short	  term	  due	  to	  elites’	  influence	  and	  their	  tendency	  to	  use	  the	  U.S.	  as	  a	  scapegoat.	  	  We	  can	  see	  this	  with	  anti-­‐Americanism	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  in	  particular.	  	  Lisa	  Blaydes	  and	  Drew	  Linzer,	  political	  scientists,	  examined	  the	  motivations	  of	  elites	  influencing	  anti-­‐American	  sentiment	  in	  the	  Muslim	  world.	  	  The	  authors	  used	  opinion	  surveys	  and	  news	  databases	  from	  every	  available	  Muslim	  country,	  including	  those	  outside	  the	  Middle	  East	  (Blaydes	  &	  Linzer	  2012).	  	  They	  searched	  for	  indicators	  of	  high	  anti-­‐American	  sentiment	  in	  each	  country	  as	  well	  as	  examples	  of	  influential	  elites	  speaking	  against	  the	  U.S.	  (Blaydes	  &	  Linzer	  2012).	  	  Initially,	  Blaydes	  and	  Linzer	  hypothesized	  a	  high	  level	  of	  religiosity,	  or	  religious	  fervor,	  in	  Muslim	  countries	  increased	  individuals’	  receptiveness	  of	  elites’	  anti-­‐American	  messages	  (2012).	  	  However,	  they	  did	  not	  find	  proof	  of	  a	  high	  level	  of	  religious	  fervor	  in	  many	  of	  the	  Muslim	  countries	  (Blaydes	  &	  Linzer	  2012).	  	  Some	  elites	  were	  quite	  religious,	  but	  anti-­‐American	  statements	  were	  also	  common	  among	  non-­‐religious	  elites	  (Blaydes	  &	  Linzer	  2012).	  	  	  This	  reality	  is	  consistent	  with	  earlier	  research	  by	  Pippa	  Norris	  and	  Ronald	  Inglehart	  (2004).	  	  Norris	  and	  Inglehart	  discovered	  only	  a	  very	  small	  percentage	  of	  Muslim	  populations	  are	  extremely	  religious,	  so	  the	  prevalence	  of	  anti-­‐Americanism	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  is	  not	  reflective	  of	  religosity	  (2004).	  	  As	  Katzenstein	  and	  Keohane	  described,	  radical	  anti-­‐Americanism,	  or	  the	  most	  severe	  hatred	  of	  the	  U.S.	  that	  we	  often	  associate	  with	  the	  Middle	  East,	  requires	  a	  high	  level	  of	  religiosity	  (Katzenstein	  &	  Keohane	  2007).	  	  The	  study	  by	  Norris	  and	  Inglehart	  dispels	  many	  of	  the	  preconceived	  notions	  associated	  with	  anti-­‐American	  sentiment	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  much	  like	  the	  research	  by	  Giacomo	  Chiozza.	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Something	  other	  than	  religiosity	  must	  have	  been	  driving	  elites	  creation	  of	  anti-­‐American	  messages	  and	  the	  public’s	  reception	  of	  them.	  Through	  further	  study,	  Blaydes	  and	  Linzer	  found	  evidence	  of	  higher	  anti-­‐Americanism	  in	  countries	  where	  elites,	  political	  or	  religious,	  had	  incentive	  to	  denounce	  the	  United	  States	  (2012).	  	  The	  authors	  described	  the	  behavior	  as	  “scapegoating”	  and	  explained	  competition	  among	  elites	  gave	  them	  the	  incentive	  to	  steadily	  increase	  the	  severity	  of	  their	  statements	  against	  the	  U.S.	  (Blaydes	  &	  Linzer	  2012).	  	  The	  more	  bombastic	  and	  inflammatory	  the	  elites’	  statements	  were,	  the	  more	  press	  and	  exposure	  they	  received	  (Blaydes	  &	  Linzer	  2012).	  	  People	  in	  Muslim	  countries	  were	  already	  sensitive	  to	  topics	  about	  the	  U.S.,	  as	  many	  Muslims	  felt	  they	  were	  under	  attack	  by	  the	  United	  States	  after	  the	  Iraq	  War	  (Blaydes	  &	  Linzer).	  	  Because	  of	  this	  sensitivity	  to	  the	  U.S.,	  people	  in	  the	  countries	  Blaydes	  and	  Linzer	  studied	  were	  more	  receptive	  to	  the	  messages	  of	  the	  elites	  who	  incentivized	  to	  make	  anti-­‐American	  statements	  (Blaydes	  &	  Linzer	  2012).	  	  The	  combination	  of	  these	  two	  factors	  caused	  an	  increase	  in	  anti-­‐Americanism,	  as	  Zaller	  described.	  	  Sources	  of	  anti-­‐Americanism	  	   The	  sources	  of	  anti-­‐Americanism	  are	  difficult	  to	  identify.	  	  Sources	  of	  its	  increase	  or	  decrease	  over	  time	  are	  extrapolated	  from	  the	  definition	  of	  anti-­‐Americanism	  as	  a	  prejudice	  and	  a	  function	  of	  mass	  opinion	  as	  described	  by	  John	  Zaller	  (1992).	  	  However,	  because	  anti-­‐American	  sentiment	  is	  an	  opinion,	  there	  are	  likely	  a	  number	  of	  reasons	  for	  its	  appearance	  throughout	  the	  world.	  	  Many	  theories	  on	  the	  origins	  of	  anti-­‐Americanism	  involve	  America’s	  status	  and	  actions	  in	  the	  international	  community	  (Friedman	  2012,	  Lynch	  2013,	  Jamal	  2014,	  Katzenstein	  &	  Keohane	  2009,	  Telhami	  2013).	  	  The	  position	  of	  the	  United	  States	  as	  a	  global	  enforcer	  and	  influencer	  has	  never	  been	  higher	  than	  it	  is	  now,	  and	  America’s	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prominent	  position	  likely	  translates	  to	  global	  dissatisfaction	  with	  the	  U.S.	  (Chiozza	  2009,	  Rubin	  2002,	  Rugh	  2006).	  	  Where	  the	  arguments	  differ	  is	  which	  aspect,	  America’s	  position	  or	  America’s	  actions,	  contributes	  more	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  anti-­‐American	  sentiment.	  	   Those	  who	  believe	  the	  position	  of	  the	  U.S.	  encourages	  the	  creation	  of	  anti-­‐Americanism	  often	  use	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  “clash	  of	  civilizations”	  to	  support	  their	  argument.	  	  The	  “clash”	  concept	  describes	  an	  evitable	  conflict	  between	  Western	  and	  Islamic	  civilizations	  based	  on	  deep-­‐seeded	  ideological	  differences	  (Huntington	  1996).	  	  Samuel	  P.	  Huntington	  repopularized	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  clash	  of	  civilizations	  in	  the	  early	  1990’s	  to	  describe	  what	  he	  saw	  as	  a	  shift	  in	  America’s	  adversary,	  from	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  to	  the	  Arab	  states.	  	  His	  concept	  of	  a	  “clash”	  piggybacked	  off	  another,	  much	  earlier	  theory	  by	  the	  British	  historian	  Arnold	  Toynbee.	  	  In	  the	  mid-­‐twentieth	  century,	  Toynbee	  declared	  that	  there	  had	  been	  twenty-­‐six	  civilizations	  since	  the	  beginning	  of	  human	  history	  (Huntington	  1996).	  	  Of	  these	  original	  twenty-­‐six,	  only	  six	  remained,	  two	  of	  which	  are	  “Western	  Civilization”	  and	  “Islamic	  Civilization”	  (Huntington	  1996).	  	  	  Those	  who	  believe	  the	  U.S.’s	  position	  in	  the	  international	  community	  leads	  to	  anti-­‐Americanism	  rather	  than	  U.S.	  actions	  agree	  with	  Huntington’s	  logic	  because	  it	  puts	  the	  responsibility	  of	  increasing	  anti-­‐Americanism	  on	  an	  unchangeable	  situation.	  	  However,	  the	  concept	  that	  there	  is	  a	  fixed	  ideological	  divide	  between	  East	  and	  West	  is	  now	  regarded	  as	  slightly	  outdated.	  	  Huntington’s	  theory	  of	  a	  “clash	  of	  civilizations”	  was	  heavily	  influenced	  by	  the	  ideological	  warfare	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.	  	  He	  fully	  believed	  that	  the	  same	  type	  of	  conflict	  would	  continue	  into	  the	  21st	  century,	  just	  now	  between	  the	  U.S.	  (representing	  the	  West)	  and	  the	  Islamic	  world	  (Huntington	  1996).	  	  Unfortunately,	  Huntington	  made	  these	  claims	  without	  consulting	  Middle	  Eastern	  sources	  and	  using	  historical	  evidence	  whose	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interpretation	  is	  now	  disputed	  (Jamal	  2014).	  	  Huntington	  also	  made	  sweeping	  generalizations	  about	  an	  “Islamic	  Civilization”	  that	  does	  not	  adequately	  account	  for	  myriad	  differences	  among	  Islamic	  societies	  (Norris	  &	  Inglehart	  2004).	  	  The	  result	  was	  a	  theory	  that	  was	  very	  popular	  throughout	  the	  U.S.	  and	  was	  read	  by	  influential	  people	  but	  lacked	  substantive	  evidence.	  	  Though	  it	  is	  still	  widely	  referenced,	  the	  conclusions	  of	  some	  studies—	  like	  those	  conducted	  by	  Giacomo	  Chiozza	  (2009),	  Amaney	  Jamal	  (2014),	  Norris	  &	  Inglehart	  (2004),	  and	  Nisbet	  &	  Myers	  (2011)—	  strongly	  refute	  the	  Clash	  of	  Civilizations	  theory.	  	  	  The	  other	  side	  of	  the	  origins	  debate	  argues	  that	  anti-­‐Americanism	  results	  from	  America’s	  actions	  abroad.	  	  Supporters	  argue	  America’s	  actions	  abroad	  are	  directed	  toward	  securing	  U.S.	  interests	  and	  are	  generally	  unconcerned	  with	  the	  impact	  on	  other	  societies.	  	  This	  lack	  of	  concern	  results	  in	  dissatisfaction	  with	  the	  U.S.,	  which	  ultimately	  turns	  into	  anti-­‐American	  sentiment.	  	  Many	  researchers	  of	  public	  opinion	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  like	  Amaney	  Jamal	  of	  the	  Arab	  Barometer	  Project	  and	  Shibley	  Telhami	  of	  the	  University	  of	  Maryland,	  support	  this	  claim.	  	  Jamal	  has	  even	  determined	  what	  she	  believes	  to	  be	  the	  genesis	  of	  anti-­‐Americanism	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  	  She	  argues	  a	  lack	  of	  American	  support	  for	  Arab	  self-­‐determinism	  in	  politics	  perpetuates	  anti-­‐Americanism	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  (Jamal	  2014).	  	  Disagreements	  between	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Arab	  countries	  on	  the	  acceptable	  form	  of	  democracy	  in	  Arab	  countries	  have	  led	  America	  to	  withdraw	  support	  from	  democratically	  elected	  governments	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  on	  numerous	  occasions	  (Jamal	  2014).	  	  By	  “going	  back”	  on	  our	  promises	  multiple	  times,	  America	  has	  created	  mistrust	  between	  Arabs	  and	  the	  United	  States,	  leading	  to	  anti-­‐Americanism	  (Jamal	  2014).	  	  Shibley	  Telhami’s	  research	  supports	  Amaney	  Jamal’s	  argument.	  	  Telhami	  has	  researched	  public	  opinion	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  for	  a	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decade,	  since	  2003,	  and	  points	  to	  America’s	  continued	  ignorance	  of	  Arab	  opinion	  as	  the	  main	  reason	  for	  the	  U.S.’s	  inability	  to	  predict	  shifts	  in	  anti-­‐Americanism	  (Telhami	  2003	  &	  Telhami	  2013).	  Of	  the	  two	  arguments	  for	  the	  origin	  of	  anti-­‐Americanism	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  current	  administration	  supports	  the	  second	  argument,	  involving	  America’s	  actions	  in	  the	  region,	  more.	  	  Beginning	  in	  2008,	  the	  new	  administration	  made	  multiple	  changes	  to	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  	  These	  changes	  focused	  on	  generating	  public	  support	  for	  the	  U.S.	  and	  boosting	  America’s	  soft	  power	  in	  the	  region	  (Indyk	  et	  al,	  2012).	  	  The	  President	  has	  continued	  some	  hard	  power	  objectives,	  like	  UAV	  strikes	  in	  Yemen,	  Pakistan,	  and	  Iraq.	  	  However,	  his	  administration	  has	  worked	  to	  re-­‐frame	  these	  policies	  and	  decrease	  their	  association	  with	  the	  United	  States	  through	  a	  multilateral	  approach	  to	  military	  action	  (Indyk	  et	  al,	  2012).	  	  The	  Obama	  Administration	  hopes	  these	  changes	  will	  affect	  the	  way	  America	  is	  perceived	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  which	  shows	  they	  associate	  support	  for	  America	  in	  Middle	  Eastern	  public	  opinion	  with	  success	  in	  the	  region.	  	  	  The	  Obama	  administration	  hopes	  the	  changes	  to	  policy	  and	  policy	  framing	  will	  make	  up	  for	  the	  perceived	  mistakes	  of	  the	  Bush	  era	  (Indyk	  et	  al,	  2012).	  	  However,	  the	  administration’s	  choice	  to	  focus	  on	  multilateralism	  and	  reframing	  of	  foreign	  policy	  brings	  up	  some	  interesting	  questions	  about	  the	  relationship	  between	  American	  foreign	  policy	  and	  anti-­‐American	  sentiment.	  	  Public	  perception	  of	  American	  foreign	  policies	  and	  elites’	  reaction	  to	  them	  should	  have	  some	  effect	  on	  anti-­‐American	  sentiment.	  	  According	  to	  supporters	  of	  the	  second	  origin	  argument,	  like	  Telhami	  and	  Jamal,	  U.S.	  foreign	  policies	  could	  serve	  as	  the	  genesis	  of	  anti-­‐American	  sentiment	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  if	  foreign	  policy	  is	  the	  source	  of	  dissatisfaction	  with	  the	  United	  States	  in	  the	  region.	  	  In	  the	  next	  chapter,	  I	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investigate	  this	  possible	  connection	  and	  examine	  some	  of	  the	  possible	  implications	  of	  a	  relationship	  between	  anti-­‐Americanism	  and	  American	  foreign	  policy.	  	  	  	  	  
Chapter	  2:	  Analysis	  In	  the	  past	  chapter,	  I	  discussed	  several	  studies	  that	  focus	  on	  the	  conceptualization	  and	  characteristics	  of	  anti-­‐Americanism	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  	  I	  explained	  that	  anti-­‐Americanism	  is	  vulnerable	  to	  change	  because	  of	  many	  different	  factors.	  	  Research	  on	  anti-­‐Americanism	  often	  focuses	  on	  the	  factors	  contributing	  to	  the	  attitude	  overall,	  however	  fewer	  studies	  examine	  the	  effects	  of	  anti-­‐American	  sentiment	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  on	  the	  United	  States	  itself	  and	  its	  goals	  abroad.	  	  In	  the	  next	  chapter,	  I	  hope	  to	  address	  this	  deficit	  by	  discussing	  just	  one	  way	  in	  which	  anti-­‐Americanism	  has	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  U.S.	  	  	  I	  hypothesize	  that	  there	  is	  an	  endogenous	  relationship	  between	  anti-­‐American	  sentiment	  and	  opinions	  of	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy.	  	  	  In	  my	  model,	  anti-­‐Americanism	  responds	  to	  changes	  in	  American	  foreign	  policy.	  	  Anti-­‐Americanism	  is	  an	  endogenous	  variable	  that	  changes	  according	  to	  the	  exogenous	  variable,	  American	  foreign	  policy.	  	  If	  the	  U.S.	  enacts	  foreign	  policy	  that	  is	  deemed	  unfavorable	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  then	  anti-­‐American	  sentiment	  should	  subsequently	  increase,	  as	  attitude	  toward	  the	  U.S.	  becomes	  negative.	  	  However,	  this	  negative	  attitude	  should	  also	  result	  in	  a	  decrease	  in	  support	  for	  U.S.	  policies	  in	  general	  or	  higher	  rates	  of	  disapproval	  for	  policies,	  as	  anti-­‐Americanism	  is	  a	  general	  dislike	  of	  America	  and	  an	  increase	  in	  it	  should	  increase	  disapproval	  for	  anything	  “American”.	  The	  endogeneity	  of	  anti-­‐Americanism	  could	  prove	  very	  important	  for	  international	  relations	  and	  U.S.	  national	  security.	  	  If	  high	  disapproval	  for	  an	  American	  policy	  correlates	  to	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high	  anti-­‐American	  sentiment,	  then	  this	  could	  affect	  the	  success	  of	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy	  goals	  abroad.	  	  As	  the	  United	  States	  comes	  closer	  to	  a	  decision	  on	  action	  against	  the	  Islamic	  State	  in	  Iraq	  and	  Syria	  (ISIS),	  knowing	  the	  level	  of	  anti-­‐Americanism	  in	  key	  countries	  and	  how	  it	  will	  affect	  the	  success	  of	  our	  policies	  will	  allow	  policymakers	  to	  make	  the	  appropriate	  choices	  in	  policy.	  	  In	  the	  end,	  I	  hope	  to	  provide	  a	  baseline	  of	  research	  on	  this	  relationship	  that	  may	  be	  extended	  later.	  	  Methodology	  and	  Sources	  	   I	  created	  my	  analysis	  using	  roughly	  the	  same	  method	  that	  Giacomo	  Chiozza	  used	  in	  
Anti-­‐Americanism	  and	  the	  American	  World	  Order.	  	  Chiozza	  utilized	  data	  from	  the	  Pew	  Research	  Global	  Attitudes	  Project	  (GAP)	  survey	  from	  2003.	  	  	  Chiozza	  selected	  one	  question,	  describing	  the	  respondents’	  opinion	  of	  America	  independent	  of	  other	  variables,	  as	  an	  indicator	  of	  the	  level	  of	  anti-­‐Americanism	  in	  a	  country	  and	  organized	  the	  countries	  in	  which	  Pew	  surveyed	  into	  regional	  groups.	  	  He	  then	  compared	  the	  recorded	  anti-­‐American	  sentiment	  to	  the	  responses	  from	  other	  questions	  indicating	  respondents’	  opinions	  of	  aspects	  of	  American	  culture.	  	  Chiozza	  represented	  the	  outcome	  of	  his	  comparison	  for	  each	  of	  the	  questions	  on	  culture	  in	  a	  scatter	  plot,	  where	  each	  case	  represented	  a	  different	  country.	  	  By	  presenting	  his	  data	  this	  way,	  Dr.	  Chiozza	  could	  easily	  show	  a	  correlation,	  or	  lack	  there	  of,	  between	  anti-­‐American	  sentiment	  and	  opinion	  of	  specific	  aspects	  of	  U.S.	  culture.	  In	  addition	  to	  using	  roughly	  the	  same	  method,	  I	  also	  chose	  to	  use	  the	  same	  data	  source.	  	  The	  Pew	  GAP	  survey	  is	  a	  great	  resource	  because	  it	  is	  politically	  non-­‐partisan	  and	  aims	  to	  conduct	  surveys	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  “comprehensive	  [and]	  internationally	  comparable”	  data	  for	  journalists,	  researchers,	  and	  policymakers	  to	  use	  in	  their	  own	  
	   20	  
analyses	  (U.S.	  Global	  Image	  2014).	  	  Pew’s	  data	  are	  also	  more	  suitable	  for	  my	  investigation	  than	  other	  sources	  because	  they	  concentrate	  on	  asking	  some	  questions	  on	  current	  topics	  and	  other	  questions	  on	  recurring	  issues.	  	  This	  means	  that	  Pew	  has	  built	  a	  database	  of	  hundreds	  of	  questions	  over	  the	  last	  decade,	  the	  most	  central	  of	  which	  have	  a	  yearly	  record	  of	  responses	  for	  several	  countries.	  	  Pew	  also	  asks	  its	  questions	  in	  nine	  Middle	  Eastern	  countries,	  including	  the	  Palestinian	  territories.	  	  The	  consistency	  of	  Pew’s	  surveying	  combined	  with	  the	  geographical	  diversity	  of	  the	  survey	  allows	  for	  a	  comprehensive	  analysis	  of	  anti-­‐Americanism	  and	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy.	  My	  analysis	  is	  broken	  up	  into	  three	  parts.	  	  The	  first	  part	  consists	  of	  a	  chart	  mapping	  anti-­‐American	  sentiment	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  from	  2002	  until	  2014.	  	  For	  my	  chart,	  I	  rely	  on	  the	  data	  collected	  from	  GAP	  survey	  question	  844.	  	  The	  question	  asks,	  “Please	  tell	  me	  if	  you	  have	  a	  very	  favorable,	  somewhat	  favorable,	  somewhat	  unfavorable,	  or	  very	  unfavorable	  opinion	  of...the	  United	  States.”	  	  I	  chose	  this	  question	  as	  opposed	  to	  another	  (number	  824)	  that	  has	  similar	  language	  (“United	  States”	  is	  replaced	  by	  “Americans”)	  due	  to	  my	  review	  of	  the	  literature	  on	  anti-­‐Americanism.	  	  	  Views	  of	  Americans	  as	  a	  group	  of	  people	  can	  differ	  from	  views	  of	  the	  United	  States	  as	  a	  whole,	  and	  I	  wanted	  to	  focus	  on	  America’s	  image	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  not	  that	  of	  its	  citizens.	  	  I	  combined	  the	  responses	  to	  question	  844	  of	  “somewhat	  unfavorable”	  and	  “very	  unfavorable”	  for	  a	  total	  calculation	  of	  anti-­‐Americanism.	  For	  the	  second	  aspect	  of	  my	  analysis,	  I	  compared	  opinions	  on	  the	  United	  States	  and	  opinions	  of	  U.S.	  policies.	  	  The	  questions	  pertaining	  to	  policy	  also	  came	  from	  Pew’s	  full	  bank	  of	  survey	  questions.	  	  I	  originally	  chose	  a	  number	  of	  questions	  from	  Pew’s	  archives.	  	  However,	  after	  some	  further	  consideration,	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  only	  a	  few	  of	  them	  were	  specific	  and	  different	  enough	  to	  create	  a	  full	  view	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  anti-­‐
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Americanism	  and	  American	  foreign	  policy.	  	  From	  my	  original	  group	  of	  questions,	  I	  was	  able	  to	  narrow	  it	  down	  to	  four	  questions:	  1. “And	  which	  of	  these	  comes	  closer	  to	  your	  view?	  I	  like	  American	  ideas	  about	  democracy,	  OR	  I	  dislike	  American	  ideas	  about	  democracy.”	  (Asked	  in	  2013,	  2012,	  2007,	  2003,	  and	  2002) 2. “Do	  you	  approve	  or	  disapprove	  of	  the	  United	  States	  conducting	  missile	  strikes	  from	  pilotless	  aircraft	  called	  drones	  to	  target	  extremists	  in	  countries	  such	  as	  Pakistan,	  Yemen	  and	  Somalia?”	  (Asked	  in	  2014,	  2013,	  and	  2012)	  3. “Do	  you	  think	  US	  policies	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  make	  the	  region	  more	  stable	  or	  less	  stable?”	  (Asked	  in	  2003)	  4. “Overall,	  do	  you	  approve	  or	  disapprove	  of	  the	  international	  policies	  of	  President	  Barack	  Obama?”	  (Asked	  in	  2014,	  2013,	  2012,	  2010,	  and	  2009)	  All	  four	  address	  an	  important	  topic,	  and	  all	  (except	  number	  3)	  were	  asked	  multiple	  years,	  showing	  their	  salience.	  	  Together	  they	  explain	  the	  relationship	  between	  anti-­‐Americanism	  and	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy.	  The	  end	  of	  this	  chapter	  will	  culminate	  in	  case	  studies	  of	  anti-­‐American	  sentiment	  in	  Jordan	  and	  Egypt.	  	  These	  cases	  studies	  connect	  changes	  in	  anti-­‐Americanism	  and	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy	  and	  show	  that	  unfavorable	  policy	  can	  correlate	  to	  higher	  rates	  of	  anti-­‐American	  sentiment.	  	  Mapping	  Anti-­‐Americanism	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  	   In	  Figure	  1,	  I	  have	  graphed	  the	  percentage	  of	  disapproval	  of	  the	  U.S.	  for	  each	  Middle	  Eastern	  country	  where	  the	  survey	  was	  conducted	  at	  least	  twice	  between	  2002	  and	  2014	  (the	  actual	  graph	  follows	  on	  next	  page).	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Figure	  1:	  Graph	  of	  anti-­‐American	  sentiment	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  from	  2002	  to	  2014	  with	  a	  
dashed	  average	  trend	  line.	  (Data	  from	  Pew	  Research,	  expressed	  using	  Tableau	  software)	  Looking	  at	  Figure	  1,	  we	  can	  see	  that	  the	  overall	  trend	  in	  anti-­‐American	  sentiment	  has	  decreased	  about	  10	  percentage	  points	  in	  twelve	  years.	  	  However,	  not	  all	  countries	  have	  experienced	  this	  downturn	  in	  disapproval.	  	  Egypt,	  Tunisia,	  Turkey,	  and	  Lebanon	  all	  show	  a	  considerable	  increase	  in	  anti-­‐American	  sentiment	  from	  2013	  to	  2014.	  	  Another,	  Jordan,	  did	  not	  experience	  an	  increase	  in	  anti-­‐American	  sentiment,	  but	  its	  percent	  disapproval	  has	  remained	  in	  the	  high	  80’s	  for	  the	  last	  four	  years.	  	  Even	  with	  an	  extreme	  low	  (just	  16%)	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from	  Israel	  included,	  Middle	  Eastern	  average	  disapproval	  of	  the	  U.S.	  was	  61	  percent	  in	  2014.	  	  At	  no	  point	  during	  the	  12	  years	  of	  Pew’s	  surveying	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  has	  disapproval	  of	  the	  U.S.	  dipped	  below	  60%	  of	  the	  respondents.	  	  The	  region	  also	  experienced	  average	  highs	  over	  75%	  twice	  during	  the	  survey	  history,	  in	  2003	  and	  again	  in	  2006.	  	  	  As	  we	  can	  also	  see	  from	  the	  graph,	  a	  country’s	  strong	  ties	  to	  the	  United	  States	  does	  not	  equate	  to	  positive	  views	  of	  the	  U.S.	  	  Both	  Turkey	  and	  Jordan	  are	  military	  allies	  of	  America;	  Turkey	  is	  a	  member	  of	  NATO,	  and	  Jordan	  is	  a	  partner.	  	  However,	  both	  have	  consistently	  high	  levels	  of	  anti-­‐American	  sentiment.	  	  In	  2014,	  the	  percent	  disapproval	  of	  the	  United	  States	  in	  Jordan	  (85%)	  and	  Turkey	  (73%)	  was	  more	  than	  ten	  percentage	  points	  higher	  than	  the	  regional	  average.	  	  Facts	  like	  this	  lead	  to	  an	  important	  question:	  if	  we	  see	  high	  levels	  of	  anti-­‐Americanism	  in	  countries	  we	  cooperate	  with	  on	  issues	  like	  counterterrorism	  and	  NATO	  security,	  how	  can	  we	  ensure	  these	  relationships	  will	  continue	  in	  the	  long	  run?	  	  	  	  Anti-­‐Americanism	  and	  Foreign	  Policy	  	   In	  the	  following	  graphs,	  I	  compare	  pro-­‐	  and	  anti-­‐American	  sentiment	  to	  positive	  or	  “approve”	  responses	  to	  four	  questions.	  	  These	  are	  the	  graphs	  that	  utilize	  Giacomo	  Chiozza’s	  method,	  as	  mentioned	  in	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  chapter.	  	  The	  responses	  to	  question	  844,	  “Please	  tell	  me	  if	  you	  have	  a	  very	  favorable,	  somewhat	  favorable,	  somewhat	  unfavorable,	  or	  very	  unfavorable	  opinion	  of...the	  United	  States,”	  are	  divided	  into	  “Pro-­‐American	  Sentiment”	  and	  “Anti-­‐American	  Sentiment”	  and	  are	  located	  on	  the	  x-­‐axis.	  	  “Pro-­‐American	  Sentiment”	  contains	  data	  from	  two	  responses	  to	  question	  844:	  “very	  favorable”	  and	  “somewhat	  favorable”.	  	  “Anti-­‐American	  Sentiment”	  contains	  data	  from	  two	  negative	  responses	  to	  question	  844:	  “somewhat	  unfavorable”	  and	  “very	  unfavorable”.	  	  I	  did	  not	  include	  data	  from	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the	  response	  “don’t	  know”,	  which	  never	  exceeded	  more	  than	  about	  five	  percent	  of	  the	  respondents.	  	  	  On	  the	  y-­‐axis,	  I	  show	  only	  positive	  responses	  to	  each	  of	  the	  four	  questions	  indicating	  opinion	  on	  U.S.	  foreign	  policies.	  	  I	  did	  this	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  make	  reading	  the	  graphs	  easier.	  	  The	  same	  pro-­‐	  and	  anti-­‐American	  sentiments	  compared	  to	  the	  negative	  responses	  to	  the	  four	  questions	  looks	  the	  same	  when	  graphed,	  just	  upside	  down.	  	  Each	  circle	  in	  the	  scatter	  plots	  represents	  a	  different	  case,	  which	  is	  defined	  as	  each	  year	  the	  question	  was	  asked	  in	  the	  GAP	  survey	  in	  one	  of	  the	  countries	  I	  designate	  as	  “Middle	  Eastern”.	  	  Each	  of	  the	  following	  countries	  is	  represented	  by	  a	  color:	  Egypt	  (orange),	  Israel	  (green),	  Jordan	  (red),	  Lebanon	  (purple),	  Palestine	  (brown),	  Tunisia	  (pink),	  Turkey	  (gray),	  and	  the	  average	  of	  the	  data	  for	  each	  year	  (blue).	  	  I	  have	  also	  included	  dark	  black	  trend	  lines	  in	  each	  graph	  indicating	  the	  average	  path	  of	  the	  data.	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Figure	  2.1	  






	   26	  
Figure	  2.2	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Figure	  2.3	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Figure	  2.4	  
	  Figure	  2.4	  compares	  American	  sentiment	  to	  responses	  of	  “approve”	  to:	  “Overall,	  do	  you	  approve	  or	  disapprove	  of	  the	  international	  policies	  of	  President	  Barack	  Obama?”	  	  We	  can	  see	  in	  each	  of	  the	  four	  graphs	  that	  as	  approval	  of	  the	  United	  States	  decreases,	  disapproval	  of	  America’s	  policies	  and	  actions	  increases.	  	  There	  is	  a	  pronounced	  negative	  relationship	  between	  anti-­‐American	  sentiment	  and	  approval	  of	  U.S.	  policies	  and	  influence.	  	  This	  negative	  relationship	  also	  appears	  to	  hold	  true	  in	  multiple	  instances	  with	  different	  policies	  in	  question.	  	  Though	  all	  of	  the	  questions	  in	  my	  analysis	  had	  the	  “policy”	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Case	  Study:	  Jordan	  
Figure	  3.1:	  Anti-­‐Americanism	  in	  Jordan	  and	  the	  Average	  of	  the	  Middle	  East	  	   Jordan	  experiences	  a	  great	  increase	  in	  anti-­‐American	  sentiment	  of	  about	  20	  percent	  in	  2003,	  the	  same	  time	  as	  the	  U.S.	  invasion	  of	  Iraq.	  	  The	  extreme	  turn	  is	  short-­‐lived,	  though,	  and	  Jordan	  experiences	  two	  sharp	  decreases	  in	  negative	  sentiment	  in	  2004	  and	  2005,	  bringing	  the	  level	  of	  anti-­‐American	  sentiment	  close	  to	  pre-­‐2003	  levels.	  	  There	  was	  another	  smaller	  spike	  in	  2006,	  but	  anti-­‐Americanism	  began	  to	  decrease	  again	  soon	  after.	  	  The	  most	  interesting	  change	  in	  anti-­‐American	  sentiment	  in	  Jordan	  occurred	  after	  2009.	  	  Anti-­‐American	  sentiment	  had	  finally	  returned	  to	  pre-­‐2003	  levels,	  but	  it	  began	  to	  increase	  again	  and	  has	  steadily	  increased	  since.	  	  This	  continual	  increase	  is	  uncharacteristic	  of	  Jordan,	  as	  the	  past	  two	  increases	  in	  anti-­‐American	  sentiment	  have	  been	  countered	  with	  decreases	  of	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equal	  strength.	  	  The	  steady	  increase	  has	  also	  flattened	  Jordan’s	  trend	  line.	  	  Anti-­‐Americanism	  is	  consistently	  higher	  than	  average	  in	  Jordan,	  and	  it	  appears	  to	  be	  decreasing	  only	  in	  small	  increments	  if	  at	  all.	  	   I	  showed	  in	  the	  last	  section	  that	  there	  was	  a	  positive	  correlation	  between	  anti-­‐American	  sentiment	  and	  disapproval	  of	  U.S.	  foreign	  polices.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Jordan,	  this	  correlation	  suggests	  that	  2003,	  2006,	  and	  2009	  also	  have	  high	  levels	  of	  dissatisfaction	  with	  U.S.	  foreign	  policies.	  	  It	  is	  somewhat	  difficult	  to	  find	  the	  questions	  I	  want	  in	  Pew’s	  GAP	  survey	  because	  Pew’s	  choice	  of	  questions	  (outside	  of	  a	  core	  group)	  change	  every	  year.	  	  Pew	  also	  does	  not	  ask	  specific	  questions	  in	  many	  of	  the	  survey	  years	  that	  are	  pertinent	  to	  the	  relationship	  I	  am	  discussing.	  	  Therefore,	  I	  am	  turning	  to	  the	  news	  and	  academic	  sources	  to	  see	  what	  was	  happening	  in	  Jordan	  in	  2003,	  2006,	  and	  2009	  and	  check	  if	  actual	  events	  further	  support	  my	  hypothesis	  of	  a	  correlation.	  	  
Jordan	  in	  2003	  	   The	  situation	  that	  Jordan	  experienced	  in	  2003	  was,	  frankly	  put,	  a	  “hot	  mess”.	  	  In	  March	  of	  2003,	  the	  United	  States	  began	  the	  first	  phase	  of	  the	  Iraq	  War,	  which	  lasted	  until	  April	  of	  the	  same	  year	  (“Iraq	  War”,	  2012).	  	  The	  effect	  on	  Jordan	  was	  immediate.	  	  Jordan	  shares	  a	  border	  with	  Iraq,	  and	  many	  refugees	  fled	  to	  Jordan	  during	  the	  first	  Gulf	  War	  in	  the	  1990’s	  (Nanes	  2007).	  	  This	  set	  a	  precedent	  for	  the	  2003	  Iraq	  War,	  and	  within	  days	  of	  the	  U.S.	  moving	  in,	  
Figure	  3.2:	  Map	  showing	  border	  	  	  	  	  	  thousands	  of	  Iraqis	  fled	  across	  the	  border	  (“UNHCR”,	  2015).	  	  The	  number	  of	  Iraqis	  living	  in	  Jordan	  is	  approximately	  750,000,	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  1.3	  million	  refugees	  who	  left	  Iraq	  between	  2003	  and	  2011	  (“Iraqi	  Refugees”,	  2013).	  	  In	  the	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initial	  waves	  of	  migration,	  only	  wealthy	  Iraqis	  were	  able	  to	  flee,	  others	  were	  displaced	  internally	  until	  later	  in	  the	  conflict.	  	  The	  resulting	  influx	  of	  people	  caused	  food,	  housing,	  and	  fuel	  prices	  to	  increase	  dramatically	  (Nanes	  2007).	  	  This	  pushed	  many	  Jordanians	  out	  of	  the	  market,	  and	  resulted	  in	  animosity	  between	  Jordanians	  and	  Iraqis	  (Nanes	  2007).	  	  From	  my	  own	  experience	  living	  in	  Amman	  in	  2014,	  I	  remember	  that	  the	  fourth	  circle	  neighborhood,	  al-­‐Rabia,	  was	  known	  as	  an	  all-­‐Iraqi	  neighborhood.	  	  Those	  who	  lived	  in	  al-­‐Rabia	  were	  often	  referred	  to	  as	  “haughty”	  and	  “not	  Jordanian”,	  despite	  having	  lived	  there	  since	  the	  late	  90’s	  or	  early	  2000’s.	  	  	  	   Many	  researchers	  claim	  that	  the	  bad	  situation	  in	  Jordan	  may	  have	  increased	  the	  stress	  Jordanians	  already	  felt.	  	  Dr.	  Shibley	  Telhami,	  an	  expert	  on	  public	  opinion	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  from	  the	  University	  of	  Maryland,	  conducted	  a	  study	  with	  Zogby	  International,	  an	  international	  research	  organization,	  which	  asked	  Arabs	  specifically	  about	  the	  U.S.’s	  actions	  in	  Iraq	  (Telhami	  2003).	  	  Dr.	  Telhami	  discovered	  that	  80%	  of	  Jordanians	  had	  negative	  views	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  and	  58%	  based	  their	  views	  of	  the	  U.S.	  on	  policy	  (Telhami	  2003).	  	  Jordanians	  also	  felt	  that	  terrorism	  would	  increase	  and	  that	  democracy,	  peace,	  and	  the	  Arab-­‐Israeli	  dispute	  would	  all	  suffer	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  conflict	  (Telhami	  2003).	  	  A	  study	  conducted	  by	  the	  Center	  for	  Strategic	  Studies	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Jordan	  in	  Amman	  corroborated	  Dr.	  Telhami’s	  research.	  	  The	  study	  showed	  that	  98%	  of	  respondents	  believed	  that	  Jordan	  would	  suffer	  if	  it	  allied	  with	  the	  United	  States	  during	  the	  2003	  Iraq	  War	  (Burns	  2003).	  	  Furthermore,	  88%	  of	  respondent’s	  opposed	  any	  support	  whatsoever	  of	  American	  forces	  (Burns	  2003).	  	  With	  such	  high	  levels	  of	  anti-­‐American	  sentiment	  in	  Jordan,	  military	  officials	  began	  to	  prepare	  for	  violent	  protests	  from	  the	  citizens	  as	  Jordan’s	  King	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Abdullah	  II,	  a	  Georgetown-­‐educated	  former	  special	  forces	  commander,	  agreed	  to	  support	  the	  Americans	  (Burns	  2003).	  	  
Jordan	  in	  2006	  	   Jordan	  experienced	  less	  turmoil	  in	  2006	  than	  in	  2003.	  	  The	  Iraqi	  refugee	  crisis	  due	  to	  the	  2003	  Iraq	  War	  was	  still	  an	  issue.	  	  Fighting	  between	  U.S.	  military	  personnel	  and	  Afghani	  Taliban	  supporters	  also	  resurged	  in	  mid-­‐2006	  (BBC	  Timeline,	  “U.S.	  War	  in	  Afghanistan”,	  2014),	  leading	  to	  more	  piloted	  aircraft	  and	  drone	  strikes	  in	  the	  country	  and	  drawing	  the	  attention	  of	  Arab	  press	  outlets.	  	  However,	  something	  that	  the	  U.S.	  had	  less	  influence	  in	  might	  have	  influenced	  the	  slight	  but	  noticeable	  bump	  in	  anti-­‐American	  sentiment.	  On	  July	  12,	  2006,	  Hezbollah	  fighters	  fired	  rockets	  into	  a	  nearby	  Israeli	  border	  town.	  	  The	  attack	  precipitated	  into	  a	  33-­‐day	  conflict	  that	  lasted	  until	  the	  United	  Nations	  forced	  a	  ceasefire	  on	  August	  14,	  2006	  (BBC	  Timeline,	  “2006:	  Lebanon	  War”,	  2008).	  	  The	  Pew	  survey	  would	  have	  been	  completed	  just	  a	  few	  months	  prior	  to	  the	  escalation,	  in	  May	  2006,	  indicating	  that	  anti-­‐Americanism	  had	  increased	  slightly	  before	  the	  full	  conflict.	  	  Reasons	  for	  this	  could	  stem	  from	  America’s	  strong	  support	  of	  Israel	  during	  the	  build-­‐up	  to	  the	  conflict.	  	  The	  United	  States	  was	  not	  directly	  involved	  in	  the	  fighting	  between	  Lebanon	  and	  Israel,	  but	  it	  did	  ally	  with	  Britain	  to	  prevent	  an	  earlier	  ceasefire	  from	  passing	  in	  the	  UN	  Security	  Council	  (Knickmeyer	  2008).	  	  The	  U.S.	  likely	  delayed	  the	  ceasefire	  in	  protest	  of	  Iran’s	  support	  for	  Hezbollah	  (Knickmeyer	  2008).	  	  During	  the	  course	  of	  the	  war,	  over	  1,000	  Lebanese,	  mostly	  civilians,	  died,	  compared	  to	  160	  Israelis,	  only	  40	  civilians	  (Knickmeyer	  2008).	  	  Though	  the	  war	  was	  certainly	  bloody	  on	  both	  sides	  and	  no	  number	  of	  casualties	  should	  be	  dismissed,	  Arabs	  throughout	  the	  Middle	  East	  saw	  the	  war,	  and	  the	  U.S.’s	  support	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of	  Israel,	  as	  another	  example	  of	  the	  unfair	  nature	  of	  the	  Arab-­‐Israeli	  conflict	  (“2006:	  Lebanon	  War”,	  2008).	  	  The	  conflict	  and	  its	  impact	  on	  America’s	  image	  would	  have	  been	  particularly	  salient	  in	  Jordan,	  where	  at	  least	  60%	  of	  the	  population	  is	  Palestinian	  (Nanes	  2007).	  	  	  	  
Jordan	  in	  2009	  	   On	  June	  4,	  2009,	  President	  Obama	  spoke	  at	  Cairo	  University	  in	  Egypt	  on	  democracy	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  	  The	  speech	  was	  meant	  to	  chart	  a	  new	  course	  in	  Arab-­‐American	  relations,	  and	  in	  it,	  Obama	  encouraged	  Arabs	  to	  forget	  the	  mistakes	  of	  the	  past	  and	  look	  toward	  the	  future	  as	  a	  place	  to	  right	  wrongs	  (Hamid	  2010).	  	  Responses	  across	  the	  Middle	  East	  to	  the	  speech—now	  called	  the	  “Cairo	  Speech”—were	  good,	  and	  anti-­‐American	  sentiment	  continued	  to	  drop	  throughout	  the	  region	  to	  pre-­‐2003	  levels	  (Zogby,	  “Five	  Years	  After”,	  2014).	  	  Some	  Americans	  even	  reported	  being	  greeted	  by	  Arabs	  in	  the	  streets	  of	  Middle	  Eastern	  towns	  and	  cities,	  something	  that	  was	  “a	  whiff	  of	  fantasy”	  for	  ex-­‐pats	  who	  had	  lived	  in	  the	  region	  during	  the	  previous	  decade	  (Hamid	  2010).	  	   The	  Cairo	  Speech	  is	  a	  great	  example	  of	  policy,	  or	  the	  promise	  of	  policy,	  causing	  a	  noticeable	  change	  in	  anti-­‐American	  sentiment.	  	  We	  can	  see	  in	  Figure	  3.1	  that	  anti-­‐American	  sentiment	  in	  Jordan	  was	  steadily	  decreasing	  after	  2003,	  but	  in	  2009	  it	  definitely	  hits	  pre-­‐Iraq	  War	  levels.	  	  However,	  the	  effect	  was	  short	  lived.	  	  As	  we	  can	  see	  from	  Figure	  3.1	  again,	  anti-­‐Americanism	  steadily	  rose	  in	  2010,	  2011,	  and	  2012.	  	  In	  2013,	  it	  returned	  to	  the	  2006	  peak	  discussed	  in	  the	  second	  section	  and	  has	  remained	  there	  since.	  	  	  	   Research	  points	  to	  the	  difference	  between	  “what	  Arabs	  were	  promised”	  by	  the	  Cairo	  Speech	  and	  “what	  Arabs	  got”	  after	  the	  speech	  was	  over.	  	  Most	  respondents	  to	  journalists’	  questions	  were	  shocked	  that	  an	  American	  president	  made	  reference	  to	  important	  missteps	  
	   35	  
in	  American	  policy	  toward	  the	  Middle	  East	  like	  the	  1953	  coup	  overthrowing	  a	  democratic	  government	  in	  Iran	  (Slackman	  2009).	  	  This	  kind	  of	  rhetoric	  allowed	  people	  throughout	  the	  Middle	  East	  to	  develop	  high	  hopes	  for	  President	  Obama	  that	  he	  would	  make	  great	  changes	  in	  the	  U.S.’s	  perceived	  “anti-­‐Arab”	  outlook	  on	  policy	  (Hamid	  2010).	  	  However,	  it	  became	  clear	  as	  time	  went	  on	  that	  President	  Obama	  was	  unlikely	  to	  change	  many	  of	  the	  American	  policies	  that	  Arabs	  disliked	  (Slackman	  2009).	  Events	  that	  unfolded	  afterward	  did	  not	  lessen	  the	  disappointment	  reportedly	  felt	  by	  Arab	  citizens.	  	  In	  2011,	  the	  Arab	  Spring	  rocked	  the	  Middle	  East.	  	  Initially,	  the	  Obama	  administration	  supported	  Hosni	  Mubarak,	  the	  then-­‐current	  dictator	  and	  ally	  of	  the	  United	  States.	  	  The	  President	  later	  changed	  his	  support	  and	  dropped	  Mubarak,	  as	  it	  became	  clear	  the	  unfavorable	  Egyptian	  leader	  was	  not	  going	  to	  succeed	  (Cooper	  2012).	  	  There	  were	  two	  reactions	  to	  this	  choice.	  	  Some	  were	  happy	  that	  the	  President	  had	  chosen	  to	  support	  the	  Egyptians	  seeking	  democratic	  reform	  (Cooper	  2012).	  	  Others,	  especially	  leaders	  who	  benefitted	  from	  America’s	  support,	  were	  upset	  that	  the	  U.S.	  decided	  to	  pull	  support	  from	  one	  of	  its	  allies,	  especially	  in	  his	  time	  of	  need	  (Cooper	  2012).	  	  Jordan	  likely	  felt	  a	  mix	  of	  the	  two	  responses.	  	  While	  there	  were	  a	  number	  of	  demonstrations	  throughout	  Jordan	  in	  support	  of	  the	  Arab	  Spring,	  there	  were	  also	  many	  people	  who	  supported	  the	  Jordanian	  monarchy	  and	  feared	  upheaval.	  	  Ultimately,	  King	  Abdullah	  II	  made	  promises	  of	  some	  constitutional	  changes,	  but	  fears	  that	  Jordan	  would	  become	  like	  Syria	  if	  the	  monarchy	  fell	  made	  Jordanians	  stop	  protesting	  more	  than	  anything	  else.	  	  	  In	  more	  recent	  years,	  the	  Jordanian-­‐American	  relationship	  has	  been	  tried	  by	  the	  increasing	  tensions	  between	  Israelis	  and	  Palestinians	  and	  Israelis	  and	  Jordanians.	  	  During	  my	  semester	  in	  Amman,	  Jordan,	  a	  well-­‐known	  and	  respected	  judge	  was	  shot	  and	  killed	  on	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the	  King	  Hussein	  Bridge	  which	  links	  Jordan	  and	  Israel.	  	  There	  was	  outrage	  throughout	  Jordan,	  and	  many	  people	  wanted	  revenge	  on	  the	  Israeli	  soldier	  that	  shot	  the	  man.	  	  This	  summer,	  three	  teenage	  boys	  were	  kidnapped	  just	  outside	  their	  homes	  in	  Hebron,	  a	  city	  in	  southern	  Palestine.	  	  Israeli	  officials	  claimed	  that	  the	  boys	  had	  been	  taken	  by	  HAMAS	  militants	  and	  confronted	  the	  group.	  	  HAMAS	  denied	  any	  involvement	  and	  blamed	  the	  Israeli	  government	  for	  using	  the	  kidnapping	  to	  make	  a	  political	  gain.	  	  Though	  the	  kidnapper	  was	  later	  identified	  as	  a	  lone	  actor,	  the	  conflict	  escalated	  and	  both	  sides—Israelis	  and	  HAMAS—fired	  rockets	  into	  the	  other’s	  territory.	  In	  both	  cases,	  the	  United	  States	  refrained	  from	  involving	  itself	  in	  the	  conflict	  except	  to	  offer	  condolences	  and	  ask	  for	  peace.	  	  This	  may	  have	  been	  a	  safe	  policy	  choice	  for	  American	  policymakers	  who	  do	  not	  want	  to	  pick	  sides	  between	  Israel	  and	  Jordan	  (who	  often	  takes	  the	  Palestinians’	  side).	  	  Both	  countries	  are	  very	  important	  allies	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  and	  choosing	  one	  might	  anger	  the	  other.	  	  However,	  research	  shows	  that	  inactivity	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  U.S.	  might	  be	  more	  of	  a	  bad	  thing	  than	  good	  (Zogby,	  “Five	  Years	  After”,	  2014).	  	  The	  increasing	  anti-­‐Americanism	  in	  Jordan	  since	  2009	  is	  likely	  not	  a	  result	  of	  the	  U.S.’s	  actions.	  	  Jordanians	  and	  others	  throughout	  the	  Middle	  East	  are	  beginning	  to	  feel	  disappointment	  with	  the	  U.S.	  and	  resignation	  that	  American	  foreign	  policy	  will	  never	  change	  (Zogby,	  “Five	  Years	  After”,	  2014).	  	  In	  the	  end,	  lack	  of	  a	  clear	  stance	  on	  policy	  could	  be	  just	  as	  detrimental	  as	  taking	  a	  strong	  stance.	  	  If	  anti-­‐Americanism	  persists	  at	  a	  constant,	  high	  percentage	  of	  the	  Jordanian	  population,	  this	  could	  mean	  trouble	  for	  the	  Jordanian	  monarchy	  that	  is	  a	  supporter	  of	  the	  U.S.	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Case	  Study:	  Egypt	  
Figure	  3.3:	  Anti-­‐Americanism	  in	  Egypt	  v.	  the	  Average	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  	   Pew	  began	  surveying	  in	  Egypt	  in	  the	  spring	  of	  2006.	  	  In	  2006,	  Pew	  recorded	  Egypt’s	  anti-­‐American	  sentiment	  at	  69%,	  one	  of	  the	  lowest	  of	  all	  the	  Arab	  countries.	  	  Anti-­‐Americanism	  in	  Egypt	  shot	  up	  drastically	  in	  2007,	  when	  the	  same	  disapproval	  was	  much	  lower	  in	  other	  countries.	  	  However,	  Egypt	  followed	  suit	  soon	  after	  and	  reached	  about	  70%,	  close	  to	  its	  original	  low,	  in	  2009.	  	  Then,	  quite	  suddenly,	  Egypt’s	  anti-­‐American	  sentiment	  soared	  to	  about	  82%	  in	  2010,	  a	  change	  of	  12	  percentage	  points	  in	  the	  course	  of	  a	  year.	  	  The	  level	  of	  anti-­‐Americanism	  has	  not	  changed	  much	  since	  then	  and	  has	  been	  steadily	  increasing	  after	  a	  drop	  in	  2012.	  	  Now	  disapproval	  of	  the	  U.S.	  in	  Egypt	  matches	  that	  in	  Jordan,	  around	  85%.	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   Egypt	  is	  an	  interesting	  country	  to	  research	  because	  it	  gets	  more	  attention	  in	  the	  Western	  news	  than	  most	  Arab	  countries.	  	  Pew	  only	  began	  surveying	  in	  Egypt	  in	  2006,	  which	  unfortunately	  prevents	  me	  from	  comparing	  Egyptians’	  responses	  to	  the	  Iraq	  War	  to	  those	  of	  Jordanians.	  	  However,	  the	  sharply	  positive	  slope	  of	  Egypt’s	  trend	  line	  (shown	  as	  the	  green	  dashed	  line	  in	  Figure	  3.3)	  indicates	  that	  Egyptians	  continue	  to	  feel	  strongly	  about	  the	  U.S.	  	  For	  this	  case	  study,	  I	  will	  look	  at	  Egyptian	  popular	  sentiment	  and	  commentary	  on	  the	  U.S.’s	  involvement	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  during	  2007	  and	  from	  2009	  to	  2011.	  
	  
Egypt	  in	  2007	  	   There	  are	  two	  events	  that	  likely	  influenced	  the	  rapid	  increase	  in	  Egyptian	  anti-­‐American	  sentiment	  between	  2006	  and	  2007.	  	  Just	  like	  Jordanians,	  Egyptians	  were	  very	  affected	  by	  the	  2006	  Lebanon	  War	  between	  Israel	  and	  Hezbollah.	  	  Journalists	  reported	  on	  the	  fanaticism	  with	  which	  people	  in	  Cairo	  watched	  for	  news	  on	  the	  war	  (Slackman	  2006).	  	  A	  lot	  of	  Egyptians	  felt	  sympathy	  for	  the	  Lebanese	  who	  were	  affected	  by	  the	  war.	  	  According	  to	  the	  director	  of	  the	  Center	  for	  Socialist	  Studies	  in	  Cairo,	  many	  people	  in	  Egypt	  connected	  the	  suffering	  they	  felt	  in	  Cairo	  to	  the	  suffering	  in	  Beirut	  (Slackman	  2006).	  	  In	  their	  minds,	  the	  “Zionist	  and	  American	  hegemonies”	  were	  colluding	  to	  subjugate	  the	  Lebanese	  and	  Egyptian	  people	  (Slackman	  2006).	  	  Protestors	  called	  for	  the	  expulsion	  of	  Israel’s	  ambassador	  in	  Cairo	  and	  the	  removal	  of	  Egypt’s	  ambassador	  in	  Tel	  Aviv	  (Slackman	  2006).	  	  The	  anti-­‐Israeli,	  anti-­‐American	  sentiment	  that	  resulted	  in	  reaction	  to	  the	  2006	  Lebanon	  War	  was	  so	  strong	  that	  analysts	  claim	  it	  exacerbated	  and	  expedited	  the	  revolution	  that	  occurred	  in	  2011.	  	   The	  other	  factor	  that	  affected	  Egypt	  in	  2007	  was	  the	  major	  change	  to	  the	  constitution	  made	  that	  year.	  	  Former	  president	  Hosni	  Mubarak	  won	  reelection	  for	  a	  fourth	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time	  in	  2005.	  	  The	  election	  that	  year	  was	  highly	  disputed	  and	  likely	  a	  fraud,	  though	  it	  featured	  a	  choice	  of	  three	  candidates	  instead	  of	  a	  simple	  “yes	  or	  no”	  referendum	  in	  favor	  of	  Mubarak	  (Wittes	  2005).	  	  In	  2007,	  Mubarak	  made	  four	  amendments	  to	  the	  Egyptian	  constitution	  that	  many	  citizens	  protested.	  	  The	  first	  amendment	  limited	  human	  rights	  by	  allowing	  Mubarak	  to	  transfer	  anyone	  charged	  with	  terrorism	  to	  whatever	  court	  he	  liked,	  even	  those	  without	  jurisdiction	  (Brown	  2007).	  	  This	  amendment,	  called	  Article	  179,	  was	  in	  direct	  violation	  of	  Article	  68,	  which	  stated	  that	  only	  “natural	  judges”	  or	  those	  with	  jurisdiction	  could	  preside	  over	  cases	  (Brown	  2007).	  	  The	  other	  amendments	  also	  made	  changes	  that	  were	  not	  compatible	  with	  previous	  sections	  of	  the	  constitution.	  	  These	  changes	  further	  angered	  the	  Egyptian	  people	  and	  led	  to	  more	  hatred	  of	  the	  West	  and	  America	  who	  were	  both	  supporters	  of	  Mubarak	  and	  viewed	  as	  enemies	  of	  the	  average	  Egyptian.	  
	  
Egypt	  from	  2009	  to	  2011	  	   Anti-­‐American	  sentiment	  dipped	  in	  Egypt	  for	  much	  of	  the	  same	  as	  it	  did	  in	  Jordan.	  	  Egyptians	  responded	  favorably	  to	  President	  Obama’s	  Cairo	  Speech,	  and	  they	  looked	  forward	  to	  the	  promises	  that	  the	  President	  made	  in	  the	  speech.	  	  Unfortunately,	  Egyptians	  also	  had	  the	  same	  response	  as	  Jordanians	  did.	  	  As	  it	  looked	  less	  and	  less	  likely	  that	  the	  United	  States	  would	  alter	  its	  policy	  to	  benefit	  Arabs,	  many	  Egyptians	  felt	  disappointed	  in	  the	  new	  American	  administration	  and	  the	  trend	  of	  decreasing	  anti-­‐Americanism	  reversed.	  	   In	  2010,	  tensions	  between	  dissatisfied	  Egyptians	  and	  the	  Mubarak	  regime	  continued	  to	  rise.	  	  The	  regime	  was	  charged	  with	  rigging	  yet	  another	  election,	  this	  time	  for	  the	  Parliament.	  	  The	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  had	  won	  a	  fifth	  of	  the	  total	  number	  of	  seats	  in	  the	  previous	  election	  (BBC,	  “Egypt	  Profile”,	  2015).	  	  Yet	  in	  2010,	  the	  group	  won	  no	  seats	  in	  the	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Parliament	  (BBC,	  “Egypt	  Profile”,	  2015).	  	  Egyptians	  protested	  this	  outcome	  as	  yet	  another	  example	  of	  the	  Mubarak	  regime’s	  corruption	  (BBC,	  “Egypt	  Profile”,	  2015).	  	   In	  January	  of	  2011,	  Egypt	  followed	  Tunisia	  and	  erupted	  into	  violent,	  anti-­‐regime	  protests	  that	  ultimately	  led	  to	  the	  downfall	  of	  Hosni	  Mubarak	  in	  mid-­‐February.	  	  For	  a	  while,	  the	  protests	  continued	  in	  support	  of	  a	  new	  democratic	  government,	  one	  without	  any	  residual	  oppression	  and	  authoritarianism	  from	  the	  past	  regime	  (Lynch	  2012).	  	  The	  protests	  swept	  through	  the	  Middle	  East,	  disrupting	  long-­‐standing	  regimes	  in	  other	  countries	  like	  Libya	  and	  Syria	  and	  affecting	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  monarchies	  in	  Bahrain,	  Jordan,	  and	  Saudi	  Arabia.	  	  Some	  governments	  fell,	  and	  some	  countries	  were	  thrown	  into	  chaos,	  but	  the	  Arab	  Spring	  is	  often	  regarded	  as	  the	  point	  when	  the	  Arab	  World	  snapped.	  	   As	  time	  went	  on,	  the	  protests	  turned	  violent	  as	  regimes	  were	  toppled	  and	  states	  lost	  their	  forced	  rule	  of	  law	  (LaFranchi	  2012).	  	  The	  protests	  formerly	  focused	  on	  toppling	  regimes	  began	  to	  protest	  those	  who	  had	  supported	  the	  regimes	  as	  well.	  	  In	  most	  cases,	  the	  United	  States	  happened	  to	  be	  a	  supporter	  of	  these	  regimes,	  and	  the	  Middle	  East	  watched	  the	  “Arab	  Spring”	  slowly	  turn	  into	  the	  “Anti-­‐American	  Autumn”	  (Oriental	  Review,	  “Anti-­‐American	  Autumn”,	  2012).	  	  Some	  of	  these	  protests	  resulted	  in	  the	  deaths	  of	  Americans,	  like	  those	  at	  the	  American	  embassy	  in	  Benghazi,	  Libya	  (Lynch	  2012).	  	  This	  switch	  from	  internally	  focused	  protest	  to	  protest	  of	  the	  United	  States	  confused	  some	  researchers;	  they	  did	  not	  understand	  where	  the	  turn	  to	  hatred	  for	  the	  U.S.	  came	  from.	  	  	  	   According	  to	  some,	  the	  anti-­‐American	  sentiment	  that	  swept	  through	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  Central	  Asia	  during	  the	  “Anti-­‐American	  Autumn”	  was	  under	  the	  surface	  of	  the	  anti-­‐regime	  and	  anti-­‐authoritarian	  protests	  all	  along.	  	  Many	  Arabs	  feel	  the	  U.S.	  has	  never	  really	  wanted	  to	  bring	  democracy	  to	  the	  Middle	  East.	  	  These	  individuals	  use	  the	  same	  history	  of	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policy	  missteps,	  changed	  minds,	  and	  diplomacy	  errors	  that	  President	  Obama	  referenced	  during	  his	  Cairo	  Speech	  in	  2009	  to	  explain	  how	  Middle	  Eastern	  populations	  have	  dealt	  with	  American	  power	  and	  oppression	  over	  the	  years	  (Jamal	  2014).	  	  Overall,	  the	  U.S.	  does	  not	  promote	  democracy	  or	  democratic	  reform	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  (Jamal	  2014).	  	  America	  often	  uses	  promotion	  of	  democracy	  and	  inclusion	  in	  the	  global	  free	  market	  as	  a	  diplomatic	  tool.	  	  The	  result	  is	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  United	  States	  as	  the	  world’s	  leader	  in	  economic	  strength	  and	  a	  feeling	  that	  democracy	  is	  forced	  upon	  groups,	  even	  if	  they	  are	  uncooperative	  (Jamal	  2014).	  	  America	  constantly	  wages	  a	  “war	  of	  ideals”	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  loses	  supporters	  as	  it	  insists	  on	  “American	  democracy	  or	  no	  democracy”	  (Jamal	  2014).	  	  In	  the	  2011	  protests	  that	  followed	  those	  of	  the	  Arab	  Spring,	  these	  feelings	  of	  inherent	  unfairness	  came	  to	  the	  surface	  as	  Egyptians	  realized	  they	  could	  change	  their	  situation	  without	  the	  help	  of	  the	  U.S.	  (Jamal	  2014).	  	  As	  Egyptians	  and	  others	  participating	  in	  the	  Arab	  Spring	  made	  this	  realization,	  the	  importance	  placed	  on	  American	  support	  decreased	  and	  the	  “Anti-­‐American	  Autumn”	  began.	  	  	  	  
Conclusion	  	   Anti-­‐Americanism	  is	  a	  complex	  idea.	  	  Distinguishing	  between	  anti-­‐Americanism	  and	  critique	  of	  U.S.	  government	  or	  policies	  is	  difficult	  and	  may	  be	  made	  even	  more	  so,	  depending	  on	  the	  methods	  are	  used	  to	  observe	  anti-­‐American	  sentiment.	  	  In	  this	  thesis,	  I	  added	  my	  own	  definition	  to	  numerous	  others.	  	  My	  definition	  takes	  from	  others	  that	  anti-­‐Americanism	  is	  a	  nuanced,	  variegated	  term	  used	  to	  describe	  the	  tendency	  of	  some	  to	  have	  negative	  feelings	  about	  “America”.	  	  However,	  I	  hypothesize	  that	  anti-­‐Americanism	  is	  endogenous	  to	  American	  foreign	  policy.	  	  This	  relationship	  indicates	  that	  anti-­‐American	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sentiment	  may	  have	  a	  basis	  in	  legitimate	  critique	  of	  the	  U.S.	  and	  its	  policies,	  particularly	  its	  actions	  abroad.	  	  However,	  at	  some	  point,	  negative	  sentiment	  toward	  the	  U.S.	  surpasses	  the	  original	  critique	  and	  begins	  to	  apply	  to	  anything,	  some	  things,	  all	  things,	  or	  most	  things	  having	  to	  do	  with	  “America”.	  	   The	  first	  part	  of	  my	  analysis	  showed	  a	  correlation	  between	  anti-­‐Americanism	  and	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy	  choices,	  but	  the	  methods	  I	  used	  prevented	  me	  from	  definitively	  stating	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  two.	  	  In	  the	  second	  part	  of	  the	  analysis,	  I	  used	  case	  studies	  to	  show	  the	  possible	  direction	  of	  the	  relationship.	  	  There	  are	  certainly	  limitations	  to	  the	  case	  studies.	  	  I	  examined	  only	  two	  countries	  out	  of	  seven	  possible	  choices.	  	  I	  also	  included	  Israel	  in	  my	  average	  measure	  of	  anti-­‐Americanism,	  which	  could	  have	  caused	  some	  spikes	  in	  data	  to	  appear	  bigger	  than	  they	  really	  were	  compared	  to	  only	  other	  Arab	  or	  Muslim	  nations.	  	  The	  frequency	  of	  Pew’s	  surveying	  also	  limited	  my	  analysis.	  	  Because	  Pew	  surveys	  yearly,	  as	  opposed	  to	  bi-­‐annually	  or	  quarterly,	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  pinpoint	  specific	  events	  within	  the	  year,	  just	  the	  change	  in	  the	  trend	  for	  that	  year.	  	  Despite	  these	  limitations,	  I	  feel	  the	  case	  studies	  show	  the	  same	  correlation	  as	  in	  the	  data	  comparisons.	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  case	  study	  findings	  indicated	  the	  endogeneity	  of	  anti-­‐Americanism,	  or	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  relationship,	  that	  I	  initially	  hypothesized.	  	  Researching	  the	  possible	  reasons	  for	  spikes	  in	  anti-­‐Americanism	  in	  both	  Jordan	  and	  Egypt	  revealed	  that	  spikes	  definitely	  occurred	  when	  the	  U.S.	  implemented	  particularly	  unpopular	  policies.	  	  	  	  	   In	  the	  future,	  I	  hope	  to	  expand	  on	  this	  research.	  	  A	  better	  understanding	  of	  anti-­‐Americanism	  will	  help	  the	  United	  States	  accept	  its	  changing	  role	  in	  the	  international	  community.	  	  As	  other	  states	  like	  China	  rise	  to	  take	  more	  control	  in	  the	  world,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  know	  how	  negative	  opinions	  of	  the	  U.S.	  will	  after	  America’s	  prominence	  in	  world	  affairs.	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Future	  research	  could	  benefit	  by	  using	  a	  more	  advanced	  method	  of	  statistical	  analysis	  than	  that	  I	  used.	  	  There	  may	  be	  a	  more	  important	  correlation	  hidden	  in	  the	  data	  that	  I	  was	  unable	  to	  tease	  out	  due	  to	  my	  method’s	  limitations.	  	  It	  would	  also	  be	  interesting	  to	  see	  the	  same	  question	  of	  anti-­‐Americanism	  and	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy	  approached	  from	  the	  policy	  side	  first.	  	  Perhaps	  comparing	  different	  “important”	  U.S.	  foreign	  policies	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  their	  outcomes	  could	  provide	  even	  more	  insight	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  policies	  choices	  and	  anti-­‐Americanism.	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